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ABSTRACT 
 
With the financial crisis of 2008 and more retirement funds and insurance 
companies entering the hedge fund industry, the safety of investor assets has 
become vital.  According to a worldwide study by Kundro and Feffer (2002:42), 
operational risk factors account for almost half of hedge fund failures.  The issues 
that underlie the operational risk factors relate to valuation of the fund’s assets and 
liabilities.   
 
Unless certain valuation practices become more widespread, hedge funds face a 
potential crisis of confidence with institutional and high net worth investors (Kundro 
and Feffer, 2002:42).  
 
Despite the improvements made by administrators to deal with the complexities of 
hedge fund investments, the accuracy of some valuations remains open to 
question (McVea 2008:135).  Hedge fund manager inputs into valuations 
compromise the degree of independence exercised, particularly with regard to 
complex and/or illiquid instruments.  The perception that administrators lack the 
required technical expertise to value complex and/or illiquid assets exacerbates the 
issue of administrator’s reliability to provide independent valuations.  Therefore, the 
reliance on administrators to guarantee the quality of valuations of complex 
instruments is in question.  
 
The aim of the study was to identify ways to improve operational risk management 
practices, particularly valuations, in hedge funds through identifying ways of 
promoting effective functioning of independent third-party administrators.  This was 
achieved through a case study approach using a South African leading 
administrator, Investment Data Services, as the object of study.   
 
The literature highlighted the changing functions of administrators, the challenges 
facing them and ways of addressing those challenges.  The empirical study 
measured the extent of IDS’ valuation practices in managing operational risk in 
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hedge funds.  Four key members of IDS’ management team and one hedge fund 
manager with considerable insight were interviewed.   
 
The data obtained was then reduced into meaningful results.   The empirical 
findings were compared with the theory provided in the literature scrutiny to identify 
ways of improving the valuation function.   
 
The conclusion was that the challenges faced by the administrator were addressed 
through proper independence, consistency and transparency of the valuation 
process.  A crucial cog in IDS’ wheel is the employment of staff with the required 
technical skills to understand complex financial instruments.  In addition, 
investment in advanced systems and technology is important in managing the risks 
involved.  Consequently, IDS’ valuation practices can be used as template for other 
administrators in their efforts to manage the operational risks in hedge funds.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM 
STATEMENT 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The global hedge fund industry continues to grow at an impressive rate and may 
top US$2 trillion in assets under management by the end of 2009 (Celent Report, 
2006).  The main driver of this growth is the increased institutional investor base 
and is hence demanding more stringent operational and investment practices.   
 
With more retirement funds and insurance companies entering the industry, the 
safety of investor assets becomes even more crucial.  Operational risk factors 
account for almost half of hedge fund failures according to a worldwide study 
(Kundro and Feffer, 2002:42).  The issues that underlie the operational risk factors 
relate to valuation of the fund’s assets and liabilities.   
 
An independent third-party administrator provides valuations for hedge funds and 
reduces the likelihood that funds will mis-price their assets.  However, there are 
many challenges with regards to valuing complex or illiquid assets.  The 2008 
financial market meltdown illustrates the challenges involved and questions the 
ability of independent administrators to provide reliable valuations for complex 
and/or illiquid instruments (McVea, 2008:130). 
 
Regulation in the South African industry does not require hedge funds to have their 
assets independently valued. However, it has become best practice to do so.  The 
South African chapter of AIMA prescribes certain valuation best practices 
guidelines which help to reduce the likelihood of inaccurate valuations.   
 
This paper assesses the role that administrators play in reducing operational risk in 
hedge funds, particularly the valuation process.  The collapse of the sub prime 
mortgage market highlights the importance of the administrator’s role with regards 
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to managing operational risks in hedge funds, specifically the calculation of the Net 
Asset Value (NAV) of the fund.   
 
1.2 RATIONALE 
 
Valuations problems have been a topic of debate for the past few years.  It pertains 
to the issue of operational risk and as a result can affect the success or failure of a 
fund.  The complexities of the valuations involved are caused by the increase in 
institutional investors and the quest of hedge funds to deliver superior returns in 
comparison to the traditional forms of pooled investment vehicles (McVea, 
2008:135).   
 
Administrators are also undergoing transformation.  The implications of hedge 
funds investing in complex alternative investments have forced administrators to 
consolidate and improve their systems and expertise.  Despite the improvements 
made by administrators to deal with the complexities of hedge fund investments, 
the accuracy of some valuations remains open to question (McVea, 2008:135). 
 
According to the FSA (Financial Services Authority, 2005): 
 
“In respect of assets for which there are no easy or robust valuation methodologies 
and counterparty quotes are unavailable, administrators usually accept the hedge 
fund manager’s own valuation. This can sometimes mean that a significant 
proportion of the fund’s assets are not subject to independent valuation. Hedge 
fund managers generally perform their own internal valuations of all positions and 
seek to reconcile these with the administrators at the end of the month. It would 
appear that the hedge fund managers may wield significant ability to influence the 
administrators’ independent valuations at this point in the process through their 
dialogue with administrator staff and the counterparties who are providing the 
quotes.” 
 
McVea (2008:136) is of the opinion that, consequently, the degree of 
independence exercised in relation to the valuation of complex and/or illiquid 
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instruments is seriously compromised.  The perception that administrators lack the 
required technical expertise to value complex and/or illiquid assets exacerbates the 
issue of administrator’s reliability to provide independent valuations.  Such 
shortcomings result in the hedge fund manager providing input into the valuation 
process.   
 
Administrators have made improvements through the recruitment of better qualified 
and more technically expert personnel, greater transparency and uniformity in 
valuation methods.  The administrator’s improvements may hinder the investment 
manager’s incentives to abuse any input into pricing of the assets.   
 
However, reliance on administrators to guarantee the quality of valuations of 
complex instruments amounts to wishful thinking.  It is a questionable strategy 
which fools unwary investors into thinking that reliable independent valuations are 
possible (McVea, 2008:136). 
 
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The purpose of this study is to improve operational risk management practices, 
particularly valuations, in hedge funds through identifying ways of promoting 
effective functioning of independent third-party administrators. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION/PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The question this study addresses is: 
 
How can administrators improve operational risk management practices in 
hedge funds? 
 
In addressing the prime research question the following sub-dimensions emerge as 
pertinent areas of focus. These areas are comprehensively scrutinised in the 
following chapter: 
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 How has the 2008 financial crisis impacted the valuation function performed by 
administrators? 
 In their efforts to bring about improvement in hedge fund operational risk 
management practices, what challenges do administrators face? 
 How can the challenges faced by administrators be addressed? 
 
1.5 DELIMITATION OF RESEARCH 
 
The delimitation of the research reveals how far the research effort extended and 
where the limits were set.  This study is limited to Investment Data Services (IDS) 
head office in Cape Town, South Africa.   The company specializes in providing 
hedge fund administration services to the alternative investment community. Since 
2003 IDS has grown with the industry, and now administers over 70 percent of the 
hedge fund business in South Africa. 
 
The study concentrates exclusively on interviewing key management employees of 
IDS on the valuation issues as an important role in managing operational risks in 
hedge funds.   
 
1.6 ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The researcher states the following key assumptions while conducting this study: 
 The improvement in valuation practices will mitigate the operational risks 
involved in hedge funds 
 Current regulatory levels will remain the same for the next year 
 
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The following procedure was followed to solve the main problem and sub 
problems.  This procedure included a literature study and an empirical study. 
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1.7.1 LITERATURE STUDY 
 
The literature study was conducted to identify the functions performed by 
administrators, what challenges they face in managing operational risk and how to 
address the challenges.  The required secondary sources included the following: 
 Text books, financial journals and theses were consulted and provided by the 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University; 
 The internet was used to search financial and management databases for the 
relevant information; and 
 Information was also provided by IDS, through the assistance of Ian Hamilton. 
 
1.7.2 EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
The primary data was collected through the empirical study using semi structured 
interview questions that were open ended.  The sample size of this study consisted 
of four key employees of IDS and a client of the firm, a credible hedge fund 
manager.  The data was collected, analysed, interpreted and then presented in 
order to conclude and to answer the related research questions of this study. 
 
1.8 PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS  
 
The researcher experienced a problem during the course of the study which may 
have influenced the outcome of the research.  The stock market downturn placed 
extra emphasis on manager performance in the last few months of the 2008 year, 
and subsequently less time was provided to answer the interview questions.   
 
However, respondents did take time in answering the questions but may have 
limited their responses to focus on work responsibilities.  Any issues in interpreting 
the information provided were dealt with by giving the respondent a telephone call.  
However, not all respondents were available for confirmation.  The researcher 
ensured responses were kept verbatim to present an unbiased account of the 
case.    
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1.9 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
In the context of the study, certain key concepts that relate to the main problem 
statement will be defined. 
 
Counterparty:   A third party that enters into transactions with a hedge fund. 
 
Derivative:  This refers to a financial instrument in which the value depends on, or 
is derived from, the value of an underlying asset, index, rate, or instrument. 
 
Administrator:  Refers to a third-party service provider offering certain back and 
front office administrative services to a hedge fund and/or hedge fund Manager. 
Such services may include maintaining the principal corporate records, 
communicating with a Hedge Fund’s investors, processing subscription and 
redemptions, calculation of NAV, etc. 
 
Illiquid/Complex Asset:   An asset that cannot be liquidated in a short period of 
time without substantially affecting the asset’s price.   
 
Hedge Fund:  A pooled investment vehicle that it is not marketed to the general 
public and is limited to high net worth individuals and institutions.   
 
Net Asset Value:  The fair value of a hedge fund’s assets minus the fair value of 
its liabilities. NAV is the basis for determining the prices applicable to investor 
subscription and redemptions. 
 
Operational risk:  The risk of loss due to system breakdowns, employee fraud or 
misconduct, errors in pricing methodologies or natural or man-made catastrophes, 
among other risks. It may also include the risk of loss due to the incomplete or 
incorrect documentation of trades. 
 
Over-the-counter transaction:  A transaction between parties that is not executed 
on an organized exchange, but instead privately negotiated on a bilateral basis 
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between the parties. Stocks of smaller companies, forward contracts on physical 
commodities and currencies, bank and securities loans, repurchase agreements, 
and derivatives are traded in OTC markets. 
 
Prime broker:  A brokerage firm providing multiple services to a hedge fund that 
are beyond the scope of those offered by a traditional broker. 
 
Valuation:  The process of determining the value of positions in a hedge fund 
portfolio. Valuation serves two distinct purposes: it provides the base input for both 
the risk monitoring process and the calculation of a hedge fund’s NAV.  
 
1.10 AN OUTLINE OF THE ENVISAGED CHAPTERS 
 
Chapter 1 deals with the background of the study and the research problem is 
stated.  Also included are the demarcation of the research problems, limitations 
experienced by the researcher and the definition of concepts.    
 
Chapter 2 comprises of the literature study based on the role of the administrator in 
hedge fund operational risk management.  The challenges of operational risk are 
highlighted and how an administrator can address the challenges involved. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the research methodology and the data gathering techniques 
used in the study.  A qualitative approach was deemed most suitable where semi 
structured interview questions were used.   
 
Chapter 4 includes the analysis and interpretation of the results obtained from the 
empirical study and aims to fulfil the research objectives of the study. 
 
Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the research study, the recommendations 
based on the main research findings and opportunities for further research. 
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1.11 ACRONYMS 
 
AIMA  Alternative Investment Management Association    
FSA  Financial Services Authority (UK) 
FSB  Financial Services Board (SA) 
HFWG Hedge Fund Working Group 
IDS  Investment Data Services 
LLP  Limited Liability Partnership 
LTCM  Long Term Capital Management 
MFA  Managed Funds Association   
MME  Money Management Executive 
NAV  Net Asset Value 
OTC  Over-the-counter 
RBC  Royal Bank of Canada 
SEC  Securities and Exchange Commission 
SFC  Securities and Future Commission 
US  United States 
US$  United States Dollar 
 
1.12 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter was to present an introduction to the study by examining 
the problem statement, the sub problems, definition of key concepts, the 
demarcation and significance of the study.  The research methodology was also 
briefly explained. 
 
The next chapter deals with the literature review and outlines the role of 
administrators in managing operational risk in hedge funds.    
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
A variety of perspectives have been scrutinised to engender a more pragmatic 
understanding of the role of administrators in operational risk management within 
hedge funds, paying special attention to the risks associated with valuations.   
 
As shown in the previous chapter, the prime research question can be addressed 
by investigating four sub-dimensions.  These elements are scrutinised in this 
chapter under the headings, namely: 
2.2 Hedge funds 
2.3 Functions performed by administrators 
2.4 Challenges in operational risk management 
2.5 Addressing operational risk challenges 
 
2.2 HEDGE FUNDS 
 
2.2.1 A DESCRIPTION 
 
Although there is no statutory or legal definition of the term hedge funds, there are 
sufficient descriptions found in literature.  A hedge fund is a type of pooled 
investment vehicle with the aim to deliver positive returns regardless of whether 
markets are going up or down (Cobbett, 2006:9). 
 
Frush (2007:3) states that hedge funds are “actively managed private investment 
funds that seek to attract positive returns by employing many different strategies, 
instruments and tools of the trade.”  These funds were originally designed to invest 
in equity securities and use leverage and short selling to “hedge” the portfolio’s 
exposure to movements of the equity markets.  Currently funds utilise a wider 
variety of investment strategies and techniques designed to maximise returns for 
investors. 
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In the United States, this type of alternative investment operates in a manner that 
avoids regulation as investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 
1940.  The act also states that public offerings of hedge fund securities cannot be 
made. In addition, they are required to allow only “accredited” investors and large 
institutions to invest in such vehicles, with high investment minimums such as $1 
million. 
 
Professional investment managers frequently have a significant stake in the funds 
they manage and receive a management fee that includes a substantial share of 
the performance of the fund.  They are, therefore, more interested in protecting 
themselves from any downside risk (i.e. hedging) than the conventional theories of 
risk and return might suggest (Muller and Ward, 2005: 49). 
 
The Managed Funds Association (MFA, 2007) describes hedge funds as a wide 
range of investment vehicles that can vary substantially in terms of size, strategy, 
business model, and organizational structure. Investment managers have the 
ability to hedge the value of assets through the use of options or the simultaneous 
use of “long positions” and “short sales”.  Some hedge funds may not even engage 
in “hedging” activities at all and others employ only “buy and hold” strategies that 
do not involve hedging in the traditional sense.  
 
Hedge funds are simply pooled investment vehicles that generally meet the 
following criteria (MFA, 2007): 
 not marketed to the general public (i.e. is privately-offered); 
 limited to high net worth individuals and institutions;  
 not registered as an investment company under relevant laws (U.S. Investment 
Company Act of 1940, as amended);  
 assets are managed by a professional investment management firm that shares 
in the gains of the investment vehicle based on investment performance of the 
vehicle; and 
 periodic but restricted or limited investor redemption rights. 
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Having discussed major features of hedge funds, a list of their most important 
characteristics can be compiled.  This is illustrated below in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Defining characteristics of Hedge Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Frush (2007:194) 
 
2.2.2 A SYNOPTIC HISTORY OF HEDGE FUNDS 
 
Alfred Winslow Jones is attributed with starting the first hedge fund. In 1952 
Winslow changed his general partnership fund into a limited liability partnership 
(LLP), where it was then exempt from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
regulations and consequently was able to transact using a wider selection of 
investment instruments. Jones realized that this could provide him with a better 
way to manage money and achieve abnormal returns over time.   
 
His investment partnership produced returns that “bested even the top performing 
mutual fund by 44 percent and the top five-year performing mutual fund of the day 
by 85 percent, returns net of fees”  (Frush, 2007:32). The stellar performances over 
the years resulted in a rush toward hedge funds. 
 
HEDGE FUNDS 
Unique structure and Organisation 
Minimal Oversight and Regulation 
Restricted to a Low Number of “Accredited Investors” 
Restrictive Liquidity and Redemption Provisions 
Limitations on Marketing and Promotions 
Extensive Tools of the Trade 
Absolute Returns 
Ideal Low Correlations 
Dynamic Fee Arrangement 
High Water Mark and Hurdle Rate Safeguards 
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With more players entering the market because of attractive returns and greater 
flexibility, the legendary investor Warren Buffet started his hedge fund and 
achieved an annualized return of 24 percent for the 13 years of its existence.  
Buffet acquired Berkshire Hathaway with the proceeds and transformed it from a 
run down textile company to a financial services giant.   
 
Over the ensuing years, the number of similarly structured hedge funds grew, and 
more made the news headlines; none so much as the Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) fund.  LTCM was founded by John Meriwether and two 
partners Myron Scholes and Robert Merton in 1993.  The fund used an array of 
different quantitative techniques to minimize downside risk and by 1998, LTCM 
managed more than $120bn on a capital base of only $4,8bn through leveraged 
positions (Maslakovic, 2004).  
 
In September 1998 the Russian debt crisis resulted in LTCM losing 90 percent of 
its market capitalization. The US Federal Reserve coordinated an unprecedented 
bailout of LTCM in an effort to stabilize global financial markets. 
 
Although the LTCM dilemma slowed the growth of hedge funds, the effect was 
temporary. Muller and Ward (2005:49) claim that hedge funds continued to attract 
individual investors impressed by the risk/return performance, and by 2002, 30 
percent of assets in hedge funds were from pension funds, endowments and 
foundations.  The above transpired despite constraints such as their inability to 
directly solicit funds; high fee structure; poor transparency and disclosure; and 
“lockup” requirements. 
 
2.2.3 THE INTERNATIONAL HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 
 
The trend toward regulation of hedge funds is proving imminent.  The American 
and European markets are currently undergoing regulation in the industry.  The 
Asian markets promote a less regulated approach in the hope that funds will be 
withdrawn from more regulated areas to more relaxed and investor friendly areas.   
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The Asian market phenomenon raises the question of whether regulation will 
sustain a thriving industry or whether it will deter investors and asset managers 
from the increased red tape.  In the USA, regulations would have brought 
managers exceeding $25 million under management or over 15 investors under 
stricter management by the SEC. The industry challenged the rule and is at 
present still debating on what extent to regulate the industry.   
 
There is a move towards self regulation in America where prominent figures in the 
SEC have expressed support for a self regulatory scheme.  If the hedge fund 
industry is able to realize that the benefits of self-regulation outweigh their costs, 
for a few dollars more the industry can protect itself from unwelcome government 
intervention.  Harvey Pitt, who headed the SEC between 2001 and 2003, 
commented on hedge funds, saying “absent any concrete suggestions from hedge 
funds, legislators and regulators will be happy to propose their own solutions, no 
matter how impractical” (Chasan, 2007). 
 
In England, the primary regulatory organization is the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA).  This body focuses on overseeing the marketing of hedge fund products 
and regulates hedge fund managers themselves.  In addition, the FSA is 
concerned with the valuation by hedge fund managers of their own instruments, 
particularly when they are highly complex.   
 
In response to regulatory issues, the Hedge Fund Working Group (HFWG) was 
established by an ad hoc group of 14 hedge funds to develop a set of best practice 
standards for the industry.  A set of standards focusing on investor protection, 
systemic risk and corporate governance was published on January 22, 2008 
(Horsfield-Bradbury, 2008). 
 
The governance standards ensure that valuation arrangements are in place so that 
conflicts of interest are minimized and that hard to value assets are fairly and 
consistently valued.   
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The standards also address concerns that arise from the knock-off effects of 
systemic risk.  Systemic risk stems from problems of valuation and risk 
assessment and disclosure. If LTCM had adequately valued the risk of the Russian 
devaluation, or disclosed its high leverage, it is possible that their counterparties 
would have realised the risk of their investments (Horsfield-Bradbury, 2008).  Self 
regulation might have prevented the collapse of this large hedge fund.   
 
In the Asian markets, specifically Hong Kong, hedge funds are obliged to register 
with the Securities and Future Commission (SFC).  These fund managers have to 
submit proof of experience and operation manuals and are subjected to random 
audits.  In Japan, all persons giving investment advice are required by the 
Investment Advisory Business Law to register with The Financial Services Agency, 
which is the regulatory body. 
 
 
2.2.4 THE SOUTH AFRICAN HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 
 
The hedge fund industry in South Africa is characterised as self-regulated.  
Approximately 60 percent of all hedge funds report data to an independent risk 
manager on a daily basis (Grey, 2008). 
 
Figure 2.2: Growing Fast - Assets under management in SA hedge fund industry 
0
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Source: Novare Hedge Fund Survey (2005) 
 
The local industry association, known as AIMA (Alternative Investment Managers 
Association), sets out principles in terms of fiduciary responsibility.  Once hedge 
fund managers subscribe to the code, AIMA will perform a due diligence on the 
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fund and will be in a position to attract more capital since there is something formal 
in place.  The landscape is slowly changing as the local regulator, the Financial 
Services Board (FSB), now requires hedge fund managers to apply for a license to 
prove that they have the necessary experience and expertise to manage a hedge 
fund (and the specific strategy involved).   
 
Because hedge fund techniques fall outside the concern of the Collective 
Investment Schemes Control Act, both individual and institutional investors are 
therefore left without regulatory protection.  Consequently, investors prefer to 
invest through fund of hedge funds and benefit from their due diligence capabilities.   
 
The greater supervision on fund managers from the regulator will have both 
positive and negative implications.  Those that are supporting increased regulation 
believe that it will help raise awareness and improve the image of hedge funds. It 
may give private clients and independent financial advisers more comfort if the 
FSB has some sort of control over who becomes a hedge fund manager (Grey, 
2008). 
 
The issue of regulation is a double edged sword.  If the FSB imposes policies that 
limit managers on what they can do and how they can trade, it will “stifle the 
current flexibility of the industry and will challenge the very nature of hedge funds” 
(Betsalel, 2006:1).  Resultantly, the level of regulation is very important.  Ensuring 
that managers are properly trained, certain industry standards are applied and 
dishonest business practices are dealt with - all of which are necessary for the 
industry to move forward.  This cannot transpire at the expense of the hedge fund 
manager’s wider array of creative investment techniques.  Conflicts emanating 
from such issues will need to be addressed. 
 
Grey (2008) argues that the because of the lack of any prior regulation, fund of 
hedge funds have been the driving force behind the growing use of independent 
third-party administrators in South Africa.  The small funds mainly outsource their 
administration, while the larger and established funds keep the administration in-
house.  63 percent of funds outsource to an administrator, as depicted in figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3 Administration in SA hedge funds 
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Source: Novare Investments Survey (October 2004) 
 
Fiford (2004) makes mention of key findings where the South African institutional 
market took part in a survey conducted by the University of Pretoria.  It appears 
there is keen appetite for hedge fund products.  Below is a snapshot of the survey 
results: 
 
 Of those institutions that had no exposure to hedge funds, 62 percent would 
consider investing in them; 
 68 percent had poor to average knowledge of the industry while a large 
percentage of the institutions relied solely on the financial press for information. 
 50 percent of the respondents expected returns on hedge funds to be lower 
than other strategies.  20 percent expected returns on hedge funds to be higher 
than other strategies.  
 In excess of 50 percent of the respondents did, however, view hedge funds as 
having less risk than traditional portfolios. 
 
The survey results indicated that hedge funds are a permanent fixture in South 
Africa and that there is a strong need for AIMA to play a bigger role as an educator.  
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Product providers and various consultants should actively educate the market on 
these complex products.   
 
 
2.2.5 THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 
 
As a consequence of institutional involvement, there are currently in excess of 
8000 hedge funds worldwide with more than a trillion dollars in assets under 
management.  This represents a tenfold growth since a decade previously.  
“Hedge funds are said to account for 30 percent of trading volume in U.S. stocks 
and (at times) even higher proportions in more specialized instruments such as 
convertible bonds and credit derivatives. Their trades can move markets” (Jickling 
and Raab, 2006). 
 
There are six main institutional players involved in hedge funds.  Foundations and 
endowments are amongst the largest investors: 
 
 Foundations and Endowments 
 Pension Funds 
 Insurance Companies 
 Banks and related financial institutions 
 Fund of Hedge Funds 
 Corporations  (Frush 2007:36) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
Figure 2.4: Institutional Capital Allocations to Hedge Funds, Year end 2003 
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Source: CQ&A and the Bank of New York analysis (2004) 
 
There has been a large increase of retirement funds into the industry.  Investors of 
such funds demand transparency and prefer to invest in more established funds 
that are able to reduce business risk.   
 
Figure 2.5: Hedge Funds by investor type 
 
Source: Hennessee Group and CQA analysis (2003) 
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Putting the growth of hedge funds into perspective, Deloitte Research (2007) claim 
that as of June 30, 2006, the total assets under management of around $1.2 trillion 
was approximately 25 percent more than the combined book equity of 7480 United 
States commercial banks.  This increase in growth has fuelled competition in the 
industry, where institutional investors are more demanding than the individual “high 
net worth” investor.  Firms that can proactively respond to the market demands, 
such as improved risk management systems and valuation practices, will be in a 
far better position to take advantage of such a thriving trade. 
 
Figure 2.6: Number and assets under management of hedge funds 
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Source: Van Hedge Fund Advisors International Inc (2004) 
 
 
2.2.6 REASONS WHY HEDGE FUNDS FAIL 
 
Although some hedge funds employ very conservative investment strategies, they 
can generally be characterized as high-risk, high-return operations.  They require 
trading activities that are considered less conventional than the “long only” 
universe of mutual funds.  Examples of such activities are investments in complex 
and illiquid securities such as derivatives and over-the-counter (OTC) contracts. 
 
 20 
With the development of an increased institutional investment base, such as 
pension funds, more and more money from retirees and others will be unwittingly 
exposed to hedge fund losses.  Giraud (2005) alludes to approximately 350 hedge 
fund closures per year. This emphasises the importance of identifying the reasons 
why such funds fail. 
 
According to a study published in a report for Congress, Jickling and Raab (2006) 
cite three reasons for hedge fund failures: 
 Financial issues, or losses stemming from unfavourable market moves; 
 Operational issues, such as errors in trade processing or mispricing complex, 
opaque financial instruments; and 
 Fraud or misbehaviour by fund management. 
 
Another study by Kundro and Feffer (2002:42) analysed the failures of hedge funds 
and found that 56 percent of the collapses (i.e. funds that have ceased operations 
with or without returning the capital to their shareholders) are directly related to a 
failure of one or several operational processes.  The operational risk therefore 
greatly exceeds the risk related to the investment strategy.  Figure 2.7 illustrates 
the analysis.   
 
Figure 2.7: Analysis of Hedge Fund Failures 
 
Source: Capco Research and Working Paper (2002:42) 
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Although the concern of a hedge fund manager and investor is usually the financial 
risk, risks associated with operational weaknesses are growing in importance.  
When operational issues are the root cause of a failure, it is associated with 
preventing a fund from managing a crisis situation appropriately in an unexpected 
financial context (Giraud, 2005). 
 
Kundro and Feffer (2002:42) identified a number of operational risk factors that 
together seem to account for approximately half of all hedge fund collapses. These 
factors included misappropriation of funds and fraud, misrepresentation, 
unauthorized trading or trading outside of guidelines, and resource/infrastructure 
insufficiencies. 
 
The issues that underlie the operational risk factors mentioned above are related to 
the valuation of the fund’s assets.  Valuation is a process of determining the fair-
market-value for all the positions that constitute the fund.  With the case of fraud 
and misrepresentation, failure originates from dishonesty regarding the value of the 
assets held.  In addition, the resource/infrastructure issues are derived from the 
inability to accurately price or risk the funds book.  
 
Because valuations play an important role in operational risk management, the 
issue has become very topical in hedge funds.  Issues related to valuation of 
portfolios will likely become the next major “black eye” for the hedge fund industry. 
Unless certain practices become more widespread, hedge funds face a potential 
crisis of confidence with institutional and high net worth investors (Kundro and 
Feffer, 2002:42). 
 
2.2.7 THE VALUATION ISSUE 
 
Both investors and regulators are concerned with the valuation of the fund’s 
assets.  The concern is derived from the difficulty of valuing complex or illiquid 
assets, and from the potential conflict of interest between the manager and 
investors in the fund.  When these are interrelated, such as when the hedge fund 
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manager has input into the valuing of the hard to value assets, the concerns are 
amplified.  
 
Because hedge funds invest in securities that trade infrequently, where transaction 
pricing is not readily available on major wires and feeds such as Bloomberg, bids 
and offers are not easy to come by. Broker quotes must be sought to get a sense 
for what the position is worth.  Some quotes of mortgage backed securities, for 
example, can easily vary by 20-30 percent.  Such securities are highly complex 
and may be difficult to value without the use of a mathematical model. The models 
make use of assumptions and forecasts that are subjective and open to question 
(Kundro and Feffer, 2002:42). 
 
Since hedge fund managers often invest their own money in the funds, they have a 
powerful incentive to show strong (or hide weak) performance.  The inherent 
difficulty to price complex or illiquid investments exacerbates the issue.  All these 
factors occur in an environment with minimal regulatory supervision and internal 
controls.   
 
The urgency to resolve the hedge fund valuation issue is intensified because of the 
following macro-economic developments: 
 The increasing sophistication of financial instruments cause pricing difficulties; 
 A broadening investor base that includes institutional investors, demanding 
more transparency and operational risk measures, resulting in increased 
regulatory and media scrutiny; and 
 The collapse of the sub prime mortgage market resulting from entire portfolios 
being mispriced (Kundro and Feffer 2002:44). 
 
According to the AIMA (2007), in and around 20 percent of hedge fund strategies 
are in “hard to value” securities such as distressed debt, emerging markets, 
convertible bonds, credit default swaps, and fixed income arbitrage.  McVea 
(2008:134) is of the viewpoint that if such securities are incorrectly valued, there 
are three major implications.  Firstly, margin levels will be incorrectly calculated, 
thus exposing prime brokers to an increased risk of hedge fund default.  Secondly, 
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the minimum capital requirements will not be determined to absorb any unforeseen 
losses.  Thirdly, reporting certain trades to regulatory authorities will be inaccurate.   
 
Over-inflated asset valuations also have an impact on the redemption and 
subscription rates of the hedge fund.  This can adversely affect investors’ 
confidence in the accuracy of valuations and can result in the payment of 
unjustified performance fees to hedge fund managers.  In a global survey by AIMA 
(2005), almost one third of asset managers identified the pricing of illiquid 
instruments as the most significant challenge with regard to portfolio valuations.  
With the implications mentioned above and the turmoil in the sub prime mortgage 
market, there is heightened concern for the challenges involved in valuation. 
 
 
2.3 FUNCTIONS PEFORMED BY ADMINISTRATORS 
 
Administrators of hedge funds deal with all aspects of the day to day operations of 
the fund, except for the investment decision making process.  The latter is 
ultimately the sole responsibility of the fund’s investment manager.  The functions 
carried out by the administrator are governed by the contractual arrangements 
entered into by the hedge fund’s investment manager with the administrator.  
These duties are found in the service level agreement where the exact standards 
to which the administrator intends to execute its responsibilities are set out.    
 
McVea (2008:130) maintains that although the exact nature of the functions carried 
out by the administrator depends on the terms of the agreement, administrators 
provide a variety of “back room” or operational functions such as: 
 maintaining the hedge fund’s accounts and other financial records; 
 liaising with the hedge fund’s custodian bank, auditor, and prospective clients 
(sending out prospectuses and other offering documentation); 
 performing anti-money laundering checks on investors; 
 ensuring that the fund complies with any investment restrictions and 
diversification requirements outlined in the offering memorandum; 
 calculating Net Asset Value (NAV), whether daily, weekly, monthly or quarterly; 
and 
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 confirming and arranging the payment of all subscriptions, redemptions, fees 
and expenses. 
 
The responsibilities of administrators are similar those of company executives such 
as a Chief Financial Officer.  Administrators help to demystify complex bureaucratic 
red tape by simplifying tasks and other issues which require extensive resources to 
handle.  They bridge the gap between hedge fund management companies and 
the general investors in the fund (Oranika, 2007). 
 
The tasks that administrators are willing to take on board are increasingly moving 
towards an array of services, including full valuation of the funds, reporting to 
investors and provision of risk monitoring services (Giraud, 2005).  However, the 
most important role that administrators play is in the asset valuation process.  
While in some cases administrators calculate the fund’s NAV on the basis of the 
information provided, increasingly administrators provide full valuation themselves 
(McVea, 2008:133).  The administrative function of calculating the NAV will be the 
focus of discussion in the research.  Below is an outline summarising the function 
and the emerging trends.   
 
2.3.1 INDEPENDENT NAV CALCULATION 
 
Regulations in America do not require hedge funds to have their assets 
independently valued by a third party.  The Deloitte Research (2007) study found 
that it has nevertheless become standard industry practice, especially in Europe, 
for NAV assessments to be carried out by independent administrators or other 
independent third parties.    
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Figure 2.8 Calculator of NAV function 
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Source: Deloitte Research Study (2007) 
 
The study highlighted that 61 percent of respondents use administrators to 
calculate their official NAV, while another 17 percent use other third parties.  The 
trend towards independent valuations is partly explained by the growing presence 
of institutional investors in the hedge fund sector.  Institutional investors require 
that funds have independent checks in place protecting their investment (and 
ultimately their investors) (McVea, 2008:133). 
 
Institutional investors require a specialised quality administrator.  The administrator 
needs to provide the hedge fund with the necessary industry connections, strength 
and experience.  In addition, the administrator must have appropriately qualified 
staff with the required experience, practice independent pricing and valuation 
procedures, and have the technology to support this enhanced role (Report of the 
Alternative Investment Group Managing Servicing and Marketing Hedge Funds in 
Europe, 2006). 
 
2.3.2 MODERN TRENDS 
 
Industry forces are calling for more timely and accurate valuation of assets.  
Monthly and quarterly valuations have been the industry norm and for this reason, 
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administrators provide NAV to hedge funds three or four weeks after month end.  
Money Management Executive (MME, 2005) found that there was mounting 
pressure for more frequent and timely delivery of NAV, with regulators and industry 
critics pushing for daily asset valuations. 
 
A New York based company, PlusFunds, launched a website in 2000 that provides 
real time NAV and risk data with the ability to trade hedge fund shares.   The 
participating hedge funds provide portfolio data to a system that generates the 
NAV and risk measures together with the rating agency Standard & Poor’s. 
Improved transparency in the NAV calculation process will give investors and credit 
providers added confidence, thus creditors will be more willing to improve their 
lending terms (Cass, 2000). 
 
In contrast, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) Special Report (2005) established 
that very few administrators can produce daily NAV and consequently funds are 
doing the valuations themselves.  As the fund’s assets under management grow, 
they prefer to “in-source” administration to save millions of dollars.  Technological 
advances result in prices falling and an improvement in the quality of information 
available.  Keeping administration in-house thus makes more sense.  For 
administrators to continue adding value, they need to work on minimising costs, for 
instance, reducing the amount of manual processing. 
 
Administrators are pressured into offering more of a full range of services, from 
middle office functions such as trade processing, data management, risk 
management, reconciliations and corporate actions to back office functions such as 
custody, fund accounting, fund administration, shareholder servicing and Web-
based reporting (MME, 2005).  The increased services of administrators help the 
hedge fund manager to focus on expanding his/her product offerings, maintain 
brokerage relationships and meet the reporting needs of institutional investors.   
 
Van Dam (2008:44) draws attention to the fact that the trend for middle office 
services is a result of the high costs of developing complex IT systems.  
Outsourcing is an attractive option for those hedge fund managers who require 
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modern systems and a robust infrastructure that large administrators can provide.  
Administrators enlarged middle office services also allow greater transparency to 
investors and assists with better operational risk management.  This trend has 
investors approaching service providers directly for ideas to limit their own 
operational risk.   
 
The collapse of the sub prime mortgage market is testament to the valuation 
difficulties arising from the inability of US homeowners to meet their mortgage 
repayments. Mortgages that were provided to low income or poor credit borrowers 
demonstrate the vulnerability of the securities that were backed by these 
mortgages (McVea, 2008:136).   Essentially, bonds were repackaged and sold on 
to investment banks and hedge funds through the creation of asset backed 
securities known as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs).  Credit rating agencies 
awarded the bonds with investment grade status through a process where the 
bonds’ features were separated according to their high, low and mid level risk 
profile.   
 
When house prices plunged in the U.S., investment banks and hedge funds 
realized their CDO assets were over valued. Because of margin and other 
financing requirements, hedge funds were forced to liquidate such securities 
(McVea, 2008:137). 
 
Tighter regulation in the hedge fund industry seems inevitable as a result of the 
heightened criticism against the use of complicated financial instruments.  The U.S. 
Congress has scheduled hearings examining the role of hedge funds in the 
financial crisis.  Ritter (2008:41) advises that greater transparency which includes 
disclosing risk to investors could restore shaken confidence in the industry.   
 
A “culling” of the hedge fund industry could be healthy in that undercapitalised or 
poorly managed funds will forced out, causing remaining funds to consolidate 
(Ritter, 2008:41).   This could have far reaching effects where the administrators of 
such hedge funds will also come under pressure.    
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Van Dam (2008:44) is of the opinion that the financial crisis has had little impact on 
the ability of administrators to perform the NAV calculation function.  A key reason 
for this is that administrators do not price complex assets with a “mark to model” 
methodology.  Alternatively, they derive the prices from a combination of sources 
such as broker quotes and independent pricing specialists.  If a broker is able to 
provide market prices, then the administrator is able to price a portfolio.    
 
The quality of a fund’s operational infrastructure is the most important non 
investment factor for investors evaluating hedge funds.  While there is ongoing 
regulatory scrutiny and demand for higher operational practices, administrators will 
continue to add value to the investment process.   
 
 
2.4 CHALLENGES IN OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
 
Kundro and Feffer (2002:42) showed that the operational risk of a hedge fund 
exceeds the risk related to the investment strategy, with at least 56 percent of 
hedge fund collapses resulting from failure of one or more operational processes 
(see Figure 2.7).  Yet, managers and investors are concerned with the financial 
risks while operational weaknesses prove more costly.  Consequently, more 
attention is needed by industry stakeholders to address challenges in operational 
risk management.   
 
Below is a table detailing the root causes of the 10 most widely publicised failures 
of hedge funds. Information in the table is based exclusively on public disclosed 
information. 
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Table 2.1 Details of the 10 most publicised hedge fund failures 
Name Year Loss (estimates) Overview 
LTCM 1998 $4,000m 
Strategy failed to absorb post Russian debt 
Management (LTCM) default shock. Uncontrolled 
leverage, absence of transparency to prime brokers, 
conflicts of interest, model bias in the risk management 
process. 
Tiger Management 2000 $2,000m 
10% loss on a single day on trading activity, 
followed by a 23% loss in the value of the fund 
resulted in large redemptions bringing the total size 
of the fund from $20,000m down to $8,000m. 
Everest 1998 $1,300m Unfavourable market conditions and post Russian debt default shock. 
Fenchurch Capital 
Management 1995 $1,264m 
Change in investment strategy, absence of adequate 
Management risk management system for the new 
strategies. 
Princeton 1999 $1,000m Ponzi scheme, conflicts of interest and collusion with prime broker. 
Beacon Hill 2002 $1,000m 
Losses on directional bets, Mortgage Backed 
Securities pricing issues and lack of liquidity 
resulting in the need to stop redemptions and 
liquidate the fund. 
Vairocana 1994 $700m 
Directional bets instead of market neutral strategies, 
highly complex portfolios leading to difficulties in 
calculating the NAV. 
Morgan Grenfell 1997 $600m Unauthorised holdings of unlisted securities and pricing irregularities. 
Manhattan Investments 1999 $500m Trading losses and misrepresentation of fund performance. 
Askin Capital 
Management 1994 $420m 
Crash in the CMO market and weaknesses in the risk 
management system, very high leverage. 
Source: Edhec Risk and Asset Management Research Centre (2003) 
 
 
Giraud (2005) established that in eight out of ten above cases, operational flaws 
are the root cause of hedge fund failure or have prevented a fund from managing a 
crisis situation appropriately.  A weak operational environment will increase the 
impact of an outside event on a hedge fund; such as volatile trading and financial 
conditions. 
 
Operational risk is defined by Thom (2006) as the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external 
events.  Therefore, there are four elements of operational risk that Thom highlights: 
 processes; 
 people; 
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 systems; and 
 external events. 
 
Processes and systems are related to errors in trade execution and settlement.   
In addition, inadequate systems may result in the inaccuracy of valuations and may 
therefore create a false or misleading impression of the success or value of a fund.   
 
The people element of operational risk deals with the lack of succession planning 
of employees, governance frameworks for roles and responsibilities and inability to 
recruit or retain the best employees (Thom, 2006).  These people risks, as well as 
fraud and market abuse on behalf of an individual within a hedge fund, all threaten 
the life of the fund. 
 
Lastly, Thom (2006) describes risks resulting from external events as inadequate 
quality of services from a supplier, administrator, IT support facility or any 
outsourced service provider.  Coupled with the possibility of terrorism, theft, and 
natural disasters, fund managers must mitigate the wide range of operational risks 
present in hedge funds.  
 
Although operational risks can be mitigated by an appropriate and professional due 
diligence process, institutional investors are looking at hedge funds to employ more 
stringent operational practices. With the lack of maturity of the industry and limited 
regulatory constraints, Giraud (2005) highlights the following operational areas of 
concern: 
 Compliance controls; 
 Position pricing and NAV calculation procedures; 
 Client reporting procedures; 
 Risk management infrastructure; and 
 Reconciliation capabilities. 
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Figure 2.9 Percentage of hedge funds potentially open to specific operational 
issues 
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Source: Giraud (June 2005) 
 
Since pricing and NAV calculation is one of the main sources of operational failures 
(58 percent), this component will be the focus of challenges occurring in 
operational risk management.  Figure 2.9 illustrates the specific issues.   
 
Hedge funds invest in non traditional securities, consequently, the pricing and 
valuation of these securities have led to some confusion.  Strategies, such as 
arbitrage trading and distressed investments, employed by funds rely solely on the 
existence of price inefficiencies in the market.  Giraud (2005) is therefore not 
surprised that hedge funds deliberately invest in illiquid or difficult-to-value 
instruments. This situation is not an issue in itself and should be compared to a 
similar situation in, for example, the private equity world rather than being 
compared to “long-only” investment strategies. 
 
According to Kundro and Feffer (2002:44) some funds are more prone to the 
valuation problem than others.  The reason being the instruments they invest in are 
complex and illiquid.  Below is a list of such instruments and their valuation issues: 
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 Convertible bonds. These can be extremely complex to value and have 
limited liquidity.  Broker quotes can vary significantly for the same issue, with the 
difference between highest and lowest bid varying by about 5 and 20 percent.   
 
 Mortgage-backed securities.  These are also subjected to both liquidity and 
valuation problems.  A separate system usually books, values and processes these 
securities and then requires manual intervention to consolidate with the rest of the 
portfolio.   
 
 Credit default swaps. These derivatives are utilised to hedge a portfolio and 
depending on the specific circumstances, mark-to-market quotes are difficult to 
obtain or unwind. 
 
 Over-the-counter derivatives. Complex options and hybrids are being 
developed constantly, with hedge funds using highly customised instruments in 
their portfolios. 
 
 Distressed debt. These are difficult to price, even with complex modelling 
systems and requires significant credit expertise. 
 
 Emerging markets. Securities in some emerging markets are difficult to value 
and are subjected to liquidity concerns. 
 
 Highly concentrated positions and positions that make up a large 
proportion of a single issue. These positions may require adjustments or 
discounts to reflect the true liquidation value of the position.  When disposing of 
such positions, the impact on the market may be significant.   
 
The Deloitte survey in 2007 revealed that 40 percent of the 244 hedge funds relied 
solely on broker quotes to value complex instruments, such as a credit default 
swap.  Another 40 percent relied on broker quotes in combination with one or more 
other valuation methodology, and 20 percent did not use broker quotes at all but 
relied on third party vendors, either alone or in combination of a model.   
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Figure 2.10 Methods used to value credit default swaps 
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Source:  Deloitte Research (2007) 
 
Using broker quotes alone raises some serious issues (Deloitte Research, 2007): 
 Is the broker counterparty to the transaction? 
 Would the broker be ready to close the position at the quoted value? 
 Does the firm solicit multiple broker quotes, as it should? 
 Is the broker rotation followed, so that the fund gets a variety of views? 
 Are prices back tested to check for reasonableness and systematic bias? 
 
The lack of proprietary pricing models was also highlighted in the survey.  The lack 
of pricing models is not only an issue for valuation, but also for risk management.  
Without the use of models that predict how price changes as market conditions 
change, correlation testing and stress testing will be difficult to perform. The 
models help to determine liquidity and leverage levels.   
 
Most stocks and bonds are being “market to market” because of availability of daily 
market prices.  However, the complex or thinly traded instruments above are 
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“market to model” where mathematical models are used to calculate value.  At 
times the accuracy of these models is in question since the correct variables and 
inputs are not decided upon at the outset.  In addition, if hedge funds rely on broker 
quotations for valuing complex instruments, the bid ask spreads of 20 percent can 
also exacerbate valuation difficulties.  Therefore, valuations attributed to thinly 
traded assets can be very different to the prices available in real market conditions 
(McVea, 2008:137).     
 
Although the thinly traded instruments are more likely to have pricing issues, 
actively traded securities may also be susceptible to “stale” prices Kundro and 
Feffer (2002:45).  Bad market feeds, human error or other issues may be the 
reasons for inaccurate third party valuations.  Such challenges are not only found 
in hedge funds, but also in mutual funds.   
 
The development of independent third party administration has been a positive 
step toward better operational risk management.  However, AIMA (2005) found 
that a mere 27 percent of hedge funds still provide prices to the administrator for 
NAV purposes.  In addition, 36 percent of the funds happen to override prices 
provided by the administrator.  Such practices are not satisfactory if the hedge fund 
manager is involved in the marking of hard to value assets, and should be a major 
concern to all investors. 
 
Kundro and Feffer (2002:43) proclaim that the valuation problems at a fund are 
generated by one of three main causes.  They are: 
 fraud or misrepresentation; 
 mistakes or adjustments; and  
 processes, systems or procedural problems.   
 
2.4.1 FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION 
 
In some instances, hedge funds will deliberately attempt to inflate the value of the 
fund.  This is done to either to hide unrealised losses or to cover up the practice of 
theft or fraud.  This was the case of the Bayou hedge fund where the SEC found 
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that management knowingly misappropriated investors’ capital (Harris, 2005).  The 
owners, Samuel Israel and Daniel Marino, pleaded guilty to fraud in 2005 after the 
hedge fund lost $450 million.  Harris (2005) states the investigators charged Israel 
and Marino for embarking on a scheme to defraud investors by fabricating 
financial, account and performance summaries soon after the fund’s inception.  
 
To conceal any losses, the two owners fabricated the fund’s independent audit 
reports by creating a fictitious accounting firm known as Richmond-Fairfield 
Associates (Donahue, 2007:240).  The fund also executed its trades through a 
broker-dealer, Bayou Securities, which was owned by Israel.  The brokers earned 
large profits on trades while the fund continued to suffer sever losses.  The fake 
auditors and affiliated brokers proved to be the foundation for investor losses of 
approximately $350 million of the invested $450 million (Donahue, 2007:240).  
 
In a similar case, the SEC brought sanctions against parties involved in calculating 
valuations for certain hedge funds managed by Lipper and Company.  Although the 
investment manager was registered with the SEC, the manager inflated the 
valuations of four of the firm’s convertible hedge funds between 1998 and 2002.  
The manager was convicted with a prison sentence and fined $89 million for fraud.  
Legal action against he external auditor of the fund also proceeded, for relying on a 
valuation process that was significantly flawed.  The valuation misstatements 
became evident only after the manager left Lipper, when senior management 
began reviewing prior valuations (Doherty, 2006).  
 
2.4.2 MISTAKES OR ADJUSTMENTS 
 
The positions that make up a large proportion of a single issued security require an 
adjustment or discount to reflect the market impact when liquidated. An adjustment 
is also necessary when large issues require public disclosure and the position 
cannot all be sold anonymously (Kundro and Feffer, 2002:43).  This poses certain 
challenges such as having the required expertise and knowledge of the market to 
maintain accuracy of valuations.     
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In certain instances, a fund will mis-mark the position in one period and will have to 
be corrected or reversed the next period.  The reversal may cause a sudden or 
unexpected impact to the fund.  Mistakes can also be initiated from which “correct” 
price is to be used.  The bid, offer or mid-point price can vary significantly 
especially on complex instruments.   
  
2.4.3 PROCESSES, SYSTEMS OR PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS 
 
Even if a hedge fund follows its own policies consistently and accurately, the fund 
may still find itself mis-marking the book.  This problem is due to a flaw in the 
valuation procedures or processes.  This is most common in cases where a fund 
invests in instruments that cannot be handled by its regular processing systems 
and some kind of workaround is required which later proves to be flawed (Kundro 
and Feffer, 2002:43). 
 
As previously mentioned, mortgages, bank loans, OTC derivatives and convertible 
bonds are all prone to being incorrectly captured on the fund’s books and records.  
In some cases, total positions may be completely excluded in error if the underlying 
systems do not fully support the complexity of the instruments involved.  In 
addition, prime brokers have unique reporting systems which make it difficult for 
administrators to automate the reconciliation process.  This issue is compounded 
with investments in complex derivatives and the maintaining of multiple brokerage 
relationships by hedge fund managers.  
 
Thom (2006) describes systems as the IT aspect of the business where hardware 
or software failure could lead to an inability to execute trades, access key market 
information and communicate with investors.  Additionally, fund managers are 
battling an increase of on-line problems that relate to hacking and manipulating of 
private data.     
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2.5 ADDRESSING OPERATIONAL RISK CHALLENGES 
 
Several techniques surrounding the topic of addressing operational risk will be 
discussed.  To mitigate the challenges above, an administrator needs to perform 
the following practices.    
 
2.5.1 INDEPENDENCE AND SEPARATION OF DUTIES 
 
Since the calculation of NAV is the focus of operational risk, an independent 
valuation process is critical for a hedge fund.  The most effective way to ensure 
independence in the valuation process is for funds to appoint a leading 
independent third-party administrator who is responsible for supervision of the 
month-end valuation process (Bank of New York and Amber Partners, 2006).  
 
Funds that do not appoint third party administrators should have compensating 
controls where there is no independent oversight over the calculation of NAV.  In 
addition, the manager’s reasons for not appointing an administrator need to be 
provided to investors. 
 
If valuations are prepared by the fund manager themselves, an independent third-
party should check the accuracy of the valuations. Kundro and Feffer (2002:46) 
recommend having financial or accounting staff independent of the portfolio 
management team to prepare and validate marks-to-market practices.  An auditor 
should also be employed to test valuations.  However, auditors examine valuations 
infrequently and only after the figures have been reported.  Therefore, an external 
third party should verify the portfolio valuations before the results are reported to 
investors.   
 
The administrator obtains prices by consulting with various sources such as 
brokers, price vendors and third-party valuation agents.  These sources also need 
to be independent of the investment manager, especially for complex instruments.   
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The person who performs checks or approves valuations should not receive 
incentives or inducements based directly on the performance of the investment 
being valued.  These people should also not report to managers who do receive 
incentives directly related to fund performance (Kundro and Feffer, 2002:46). 
 
 
2.5.2 CONSISTENCY IN THE VALUATION PROCESS 
 
Price consistency requires that similar securities should be valued the same way 
both at a point in time and over time.  The Bank of New York and Amber Partners 
(2006) recommend having procedures in place when a fund bases month-end 
valuations for certain instruments on multiple broker quotes.  Procedures should 
not allow quotations to be chosen according to how favourable they might be, for 
example, the highest mark or the source that most softens portfolio performance. 
 
In addition, multiple quotes should be averaged in the same way across all funds 
managed by a hedge fund.  This practice ensures “consistent sampling of market 
price dispersion month-to-month” (Bank of New York and Amber Partners, 2006). 
Multiple broker quotes should be sourced consistently and accessed by the 
administrator independently without intervention by the investment manager (MFA, 
2007). 
 
Complex or illiquid securities that require broker quotes for final value should be 
combined with another source, such as a third party pricing vendor.  Where a 
security can be modelled, such as a swap, it should be modelled (Deloitte 
Research, 2007).  These models assist with risk management practises such as 
leverage and liquidity requirements.   
 
A Valuation Policy Document should be drawn up by the fund’s governing body 
that specifies workable valuation practises, procedures and controls.  The 
document should outline the hierarchy of pricing sources used for each type of 
instrument, such as which source is primary and which is secondary (MFA, 2007).  
Tolerance levels for variances of each security type need to be outlined as well. 
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Hedge funds therefore use a wide array of sources, methods, rules and models to 
assist with the valuation process.  Such practices have to be applied consistently, 
with any deviations or unusual circumstances clearly noted and documentation 
saved (Kundro and Feffer, 2002:46). When application of the pricing policy is not 
consistent, approval from the fund’s governing body is required before the formal 
release of NAV (MFA, 2007).   
 
2.5.3 SUPERVISION AND GOVERNANCE 
 
A set of clearly documented valuation policies and procedures need to be in place, 
as well as ensuring that those polices and procedures are actually followed in 
practice. A fund can test whether the policies are applicable through external 
validation, testing, and audit (Kundro and Feffer, 2002:46).  Pricing models should 
also be tested independently and then approved by the governing body. 
 
Management should review valuations and there should be evidence that pricing 
discrepancies have been brought to the hedge fund management’s attention. If this 
is the case, the appropriate action needs to take place such as a resolution 
procedure for managing exceptions (MFA, 2007). Resolving pricing issues for 
illiquid positions and exotic instruments should remain the ultimate responsibility of 
the fund’s governing body. However, the final NAV should be addressed directly to 
investors by the administrator and any NAV produced by the investment manager 
should be justified.    
 
When a fund invests in the problem-prone instruments mentioned above, a certain 
number of honest valuation discrepancies are inevitable (Kundro and Feffer, 
2002:46). But the management oversight is critical to ensuring the safety of 
investor assets in the fund.  A fund manager should acknowledge that the 
discrepancies occur, how they handle them, and whether they document the 
results.  Such recognitions can go a long way in addressing the operational risks 
involved. 
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In the case of Lipper, simple checks and balances where not present in the 
compliance process.  The lack of management oversight and separation of duties 
increased the operational risks of the fund.  Senior management should have been 
more actively involved in the valuation process, hindering the manipulation of asset 
prices for such an extended period of time (Doherty, 2006). 
 
2.5.4 ROBUST INTERNAL CONTROLS AND PROCEDURES 
 
Although Giraud (2005) believes that the investor needs to receive an indisputable 
commitment that price inefficiencies will not be used against his or her own 
interest, internal controls need to support the commitment.  A pricing policy for hard 
to value instruments should be depicted in the offering memorandum or the 
Valuation Policy Document. The policy ought to explain whether a valuation 
committee is dedicated to fair value pricing or valuations are derived from statistical 
methods or through a consensus among third parties. 
 
The MFA (2007) realises that in some cases the investment manager has the best 
insight for valuing particular instruments.  In this instance, the administrator needs 
to be supplied with sufficient supporting information from the manager.   
 
Robust internal controls and procedures should be in place over each stage of the 
trading cycle: trade authorisation, execution, confirmation, settlement, 
reconciliation and accounting (Bank of New York and Amber Partners, 2006).  
Given the incidences of fraud involving the theft of fund assets, such as the Bayou 
hedge fund, both wire transfers and other asset movements must be tightly 
controlled. The management of a fund should not allow assets to be moved outside 
the fund on a single signature and there should be effective segregation of duties 
over cash movements.  
 
2.5.5 VALUATION TRANSPARENCY 
 
The concept of transparency addresses the extent to which the fund manager 
clearly communicates to investors the specific methods and processes used to 
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value securities when determining NAV (Bank of New York and Amber Partners, 
2006).  One way of communicating the methods used to value each type of 
instrument is the development of a “pricing matrix”.  The pricing policies should be 
maintained by the third-party administrator and can be made available to investors 
by the manager’s direction. 
 
Best practice transparency standards also relate to the application of pre-
determined policies and thresholds to challenge and override prices.  Formal 
documentation of valuation exemptions should be kept.  Equally, the valuation 
committee needs to record changes to any policy, pricing or exemptions with 
regard to NAV calculation (Bank of New York and Amber Partners, 2006). 
 
2.5.6 QUALITY SERVICE PROVIDERS 
 
The Bank of New York and Amber Partners (2006) suggest that failure to appoint 
well-known, proven and independent service providers may be a warning sign to 
investors.   
 
The auditors of a fund should be one of the “big four” or a specialised audit firm 
with the market reputation for auditing hedge funds.  Prime brokers and other 
counterparties should be high quality financial institutions.  The fund manager and 
administrator need to also display transparency in the identities of the 
counterparties.   
 
2.5.7 TECHNICAL EXPERTISE 
 
Although the functions performed by administrators vary, anything less than full 
service fund administration, such as preparation of a complete set of accounting 
records, increases operational risk of a hedge fund (Bank of New York and Amber 
Partners, 2006).  Accordingly, funds should hire firms that have the adequate 
capital resources to invest in IT systems, high calibre staff and training 
programmes.   
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The workforce is required to have the level of knowledge and expertise to carry out 
the calculation of complex instruments such as derivatives.  Such specialists need 
to understand the underlying investment strategies and pricing options.  Traditional 
pricing vendors cannot provide such specialised services, hence the need for 
derivative experts who have experience in developing and running pricing models 
for these complex instruments (MME, 2005).  Teams that are dedicated to the 
valuation function can provide timely support to the manager’s requests and 
ensure operational efficiency. 
 
Although there are various business valuation certifications, standards and 
guidelines, the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts website 
provides a detailed credentials chart.  The certifications provided help to ensure 
that the individuals are fitted with the right skills to value complex instruments. 
 
A good relationship with the hedge fund manager improves the reputation of the 
administrator and ultimately enhances the marketability of the hedge fund.  This 
bodes well for both existing and potential investors who look for integrity, accuracy 
and timeliness of the valuation process (Hamilton, 2006). 
 
2.5.8 ADVANCED SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Administrators should invest in systems which utilise straight through processing 
capabilities to the accounting systems.  The systems need to handle an increasing 
number of listed instruments and automatically reconcile and price portfolios.   
Such systems reduce the need for manual intervention and help manage 
operational risks (Bank of New York and Amber Partners, 2006). 
 
To meet the need for timely and accurate valuations, administrators are hiring 
people with expertise in pricing complex derivatives.  In addition, they are 
establishing procedures and modelling systems for determining final value where 
public information is not available (MME, 2005). 
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Consequently, the following requirements of an administrator support the NAV 
calculation role: 
 
 A solid business infrastructure is required to support the investment process as 
well as the increased levels of reporting.   As more investors begin to invest in 
alternative investments, greater demands are being placed on fund managers.  
These demands require a more complex administration infrastructure than that 
which the manager alone is able to set up (Hamilton, 2006).  
 
 To provide the supporting infrastructure, advanced technology is required to 
automate the administration process. Since the administrator is the main 
channel between the manager and prime broker, automated reconciliation with 
the prime broker is essential.  An administrator can only calculate a reliable 
NAV once all the transactions of the hedge fund reconcile with the 
administrators records and third parties, such as a prime broker.  Therefore, the 
software and systems in place need to calculate the value of the fund 
accurately and on a timely basis.   The systems need to also handle different 
types of asset classes.   
 
Furthermore, the systems need to allocate income locally and offshore and capture 
multiple incentive and management fees.  For these reasons, the technology 
platform should perform the following tasks:  
 take trades in automatically;  
 reconcile to prime brokers and other counterparties in a timely 
and automated manner;  
 perform all pricing and net asset calculations within the same 
system, including derivatives; and 
 allocate income to investors (MME, 2005). 
Internationally renowned software provide for these requirements. 
 
Although daily pricing for illiquid instruments were once thought of as an impossible 
feature, technological innovation in the software industry makes daily NAV 
possible.  Thornton (2007) agrees with the fact that a trading desk knows the profit 
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and loss every day, therefore a hedge fund should as well.  The technology exists 
to produce daily prices, however, the offshore administration world and older 
hedge funds need to undergo major technology upgrades.  
 
2.5.9 MANAGED ACCOUNTS 
 
Cunningham (2005) believes that hedge fund investments made through 
separately managed accounts have become the structure of choice for investors 
seeking to minimize the risk of fraud and operational risk.  The same investment 
management services are provided to investors, but in a separately managed 
account.  The manager replicates the trading strategy outside of the funds books 
through an account that remains in the name of the investor (Giraud, 2005). 
 
The investor may add specific investment guidelines to the separately managed 
account such as prohibiting investments in illiquid securities.  The investor receives 
better liquidity terms, lower expenses, full transparency and monthly (sometimes 
daily) validation of the investment value (Cunningham, 2005).  
 
However, Giraud (2005) is of the opinion that assessing positions on a daily basis 
requires extensive understanding of the instruments traded and might result in an 
operational “headache”.  The representative of the account will have to price every 
single security, which can require a level of operations similar to a back office 
processing centre.   
 
The most secure environment would be advanced management account platforms 
that provide an array of back and front office services, together with independent 
valuation and risk monitoring.  Additionally, contractual arrangements supporting 
strict control over the manager’s operations will preserve the security of investor’s 
assets (Giraud, 2005).  Only then can the benefits of liquidity, transparency, fraud 
controls, and controls over cash movements outweigh the costs or challenges 
associated with separately managed accounts (Cunningham, 2005). 
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According to Duetche Bank’s Alternative Investment Survey (2005), 29 percent of 
the 650 investment firms responded to using managed accounts.  This is an 
increase of 9 percent from the previous year with foundations constituting the 
highest percentage (50 percent) and insurance companies the lowest (10 percent).  
Clearly, there is a trend toward the use of separately managed accounts.   
 
2.5.10 SIDE POCKETS 
 
Side pockets are an attractive solution for valuing illiquid assets.  The hedge fund 
keeps difficult to value assets into a side pocket until the liquidation of the asset 
occurs.  In most cases, no trading and market data will be available until the 
anticipated trigger event occurs.  Investors in the fund at the time which the 
relevant asset is acquired will participate in any gains or losses attributable to that 
asset (HFWG, 2007).   
 
This mechanism protects investors against adverse timing of withdrawals, and 
effectively reduces the risk of illiquidity issues for limited partners.  A drawback with 
side pockets is that they raise disclosure issues since their use must be included in 
the organisational documents and marketing materials of the fund. In addition, 
accuracy of diversification numbers may be in question causing the nature of the 
portfolio to be inaccurate (Doherty, 2006). 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter served to create a basic understanding of what operational risk is and 
why it is important to manage the risks involved.  An independent third party 
administrator is the best solution for managing the risks associated when 
calculating the NAV of the hedge fund.   
 
The chapter explored the changing functions of administrators, the operational 
risks involved when performing valuations.  The latter part of the chapter examined 
more specifically how to address the challenges experienced by administrators 
when managing operational risk.   
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In chapter three, the research methodology and the empirical study will be outlined 
in more detail.   
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CHAPTER THREE: DESIGN OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter focuses on the research approach applied to resolve the main and 
sub-problems as identified in chapter one. It includes an outline of the research 
design and chosen research methodology, and then details the two data gathering 
tools, interviews and document analysis.   
 
Finally, the validity and reliability of the study is explained to ensure the researcher 
did not have error in the measurement instruments.    
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Welman & Kruger (1999:2) refer to research as the process in which scientific 
methods are used to expand knowledge in a particular field of study. It is a process 
that involves the application of various methods and techniques to create 
scientifically obtainable knowledge by using objective methods and procedures.  
Leedy and Ormrod (2005:2) describe research as a systematic process of 
collecting and analysing information or data to increase understanding of the 
phenomenon about which the research is concerned or interested. 
 
Eight characteristics of research projects are identified below.  Research: 
 originates with a question or problem; 
 requires a clear articulation of a goal; 
 follows a specific plan or procedure; 
 usually divides the principle problem into more manageable sub problems; 
 is guided by the specific research problem, question, or hypothesis; 
 accepts certain critical assumptions; 
 requires the collection and interpretation of data in an attempt to 
resolve the problem that initiated the research; and 
 is cyclical or, more exactly, helical (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:2). 
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Leedy and Ormrod (2005:85) indicate that research design provides the overall 
structure for the procedures followed, the data collected and analysed by the 
researcher.  They highlight that the design is key to the success of the research 
project. 
 
The research design for this study was adopted to address the main and sub 
problems.  
 
3.2.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
As discussed in chapter one, the main problem is identified as how administrators 
can improve operational risk management practices in hedge funds, particularly the 
valuations function? 
 
The following three sub-problems were identified to resolve the main problem. 
These are: 
 
 Sub problem one 
How has the 2008 financial crisis impacted the valuation function performed by 
administrators? 
 
 Sub problem two 
In their efforts to bring about improvement in hedge fund operational risk 
management practices, what challenges do administrators face? 
 
 Sub problem three 
How can the challenges faced by administrators be addressed? 
 
 
 
 
 
 49 
3.2.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND SUB-PROBLEM RESOLUTION 
 
The main problem and its sub dimensions were resolved through analysis and 
interpretation of the results obtained from the empirical study as outlined in chapter 
four. 
 
3.2.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
In this study, the objective of the research is to improve the role of the 
administrator in hedge fund operational risk management, paying special attention 
to the valuation process.   
 
3.2.4 USE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The results from this study will be used by the executive management team of 
Investment Data Services (IDS) to improve the administrator’s function of 
performing valuations and better managing the operational risks involved in hedge 
funds.  Administrators and hedge fund managers will benefit as the improvement in 
operational risk management practices assist in ensuring the safety of investors’ 
assets.   
 
3.2.5 TARGET POPULATION 
 
The target population is defined as the collection of constituents that posses the 
information sought by the researcher and about which inferences are to be made 
(Malhotra, 1993: 352).   
 
The target population of this study was restricted to the management team of IDS.   
Four employees were interviewed while the fifth respondent was a hedge fund 
manager who was included in the population because of his extensive experience 
in the hedge fund industry.  The detail of each respondent is shown in Table 3.3 
under section 3.4.1.   
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3.3 CHOOSING AN APPROPRIATE RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
3.3.1 QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE DATA 
 
 
Mariampolski (2001:22) points out that a qualitative as opposed to a quantitative 
research strategy generally depends on the kinds of questions being addressed, 
the nature of the population being studied and the overall objective of the research.   
 
According to McMillan and Schumacher (1993:372), qualitative research is 
concerned with understanding participants’ feelings, beliefs, morals, thoughts and 
actions.  The qualitative researcher therefore realises that the issue has many 
dimensions and layers, and so they depict the issue in its multifaceted form (Leedy 
and Ormrod 2005:133).   
 
Quantitative research, on the other hand, involves seeking explanations and 
predictions that will generalise to other persons or places.  Leedy and Ormrod 
(2005:95) refer to the researcher’s intent to establish, confirm, or validate 
relationships and to develop generalisations that contribute to theory. The 
researcher is compelled to remain detached from the participants to draw unbiased 
conclusions.    
 
Hair et al. (2006:172) summarise the key differences between qualitative and 
quantitative methods.  These are shown in the following table: 
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Table 3.1 Differences between qualitative and quantitative methods 
Factors/Characteristics Qualitative Quantitative 
Research goals / 
objectives 
Discovery and 
identification of new 
ideas, thoughts, 
feelings 
Validation of facts, 
estimates, relationships, 
predictions 
Type of research Normally exploratory designs 
Descriptive and causal 
designs 
Type of questions 
Open-ended, semi 
structured, 
unstructured, 
deep probing 
Mostly structured 
Time of execution Relatively short time frames 
Usually significantly 
longer time frames 
Representativeness 
Small samples, limited 
to the sampled 
respondents 
Large samples, normally 
good representation of 
target population 
Type of analyses 
Debriefing, subjective 
content, interpretive, 
semiotic analyses 
Statistical, descriptive, 
causal predictions and 
relationships 
Researcher skills 
Interpersonal 
communications, 
observations, 
interpretive skills 
Scientific, statistical 
procedure and translation 
skills; and some 
subjective interpretive 
skills 
Generalisability of 
results 
Very limited; only 
preliminary insights and 
understanding 
Usually very good; 
inferences about facts, 
estimates of relationships 
Source: Hair et al. (2006:172) 
 
3.3.2 THE RESEARCH METHOD ADOPTED 
 
The research method selected should be based on research problem addressed 
and the skills of the researcher (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005:105).  Below is a table 
that helped guide the researcher in adopting the chosen method.   
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Table 3.2 Choosing an appropriate research method 
Use this approach if: Quantitative Qualitative 
1. You believe that: There is an objective 
reality that can be 
measured 
There are multiple 
possible realities 
constructed by 
different individuals 
2. Your audience is: Familiar 
with/supportive of 
quantitative studies 
Familiar 
with/supportive of 
qualitative studies 
3. Your research                    
question is: 
Confirmatory, 
predictive 
Exploratory, 
interpretive 
4. The available 
literature is: 
Relatively large Limited 
5. Your research focus: Covers a lot of 
breadth 
Involves in-depth 
study 
6. Your time available is: Relatively short Relatively long 
7. Your ability/desire to 
work with people is: 
Medium to low High 
8. Your desire for 
structure is: 
High Low 
9. Your skills in the 
area/s of: 
Deductive reasoning 
and statistics 
Inductive reasoning 
and attention to 
detail 
10. Your writing skills 
are strong in the area 
of: 
Technical, scientific 
writing 
Literary, narrative 
writing 
Source: Leedy and Ormrod (2005:106) 
 
The researcher found that the amount of literature available was not extensive, but 
rather limited since the financial crisis effects were not fully realised.  The 
researcher also wanted to focus on an in-depth study on how an administrator can 
improve operational risk management practices in hedge funds.  The research 
question therefore needed to be exploratory in nature and required inductive 
reasoning.   
 
For these reasons, and that there could be multiple possible realities created by 
the different respondents, the researcher decided that a qualitative methodology 
would be most suited to this particularly area of study.   
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Cresswell (1994) highlights the five main qualitative research types: 
 The Biography; 
 Phenomenology;  
 Grounded Theory; 
 Ethnography; and 
 Case Study.  
 
The Biography, Phenomenology, Grounded Theory and Ethnography methods 
were discounted on the grounds of inappropriateness because the role of 
administrators are not clearly defined within the industry and require more learning 
about the poorly understood situation.  For this reason, the research focus area 
lends itself toward a Case Study approach.   
 
The research focused on a single case, IDS, where the firm’s circumstances can 
promote understanding or inform practice for similar situations.  The approach is 
useful because it generates or provides preliminary support for the research 
outcomes.  However, a disadvantage is that the findings may not be generalisable 
to other situations (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:135).   
 
3.4 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
3.4.1 SAMPLING METHODS 
 
With descriptive research, a random selection process is used to choose a 
segment of the population that will be representative of the sample.  Each sample 
is chosen in such a way that each member of the population has an equal chance 
of being selected (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:199).  This sampling method was not 
considered appropriate as the researcher required a sample of high credibility that 
would provide the best information.   
 
The “purposeful sampling” approach, which is a non-random selection process, 
was used to select the sample group. This approach was decided on because it 
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allowed the researcher to select those “individuals that will yield the most 
information” (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:145) about the role of the administrator in 
operational risk management.   
 
The chosen sample was presumed to be representative of the population, since 
inferences were drawn from the entire IDS body.  The five people interviewed 
were:       
 
 Ian Hamilton – Executive Chairman 
Qualifications: B.Com, LLB. MBA 
Hedge Fund experience: 25 years 
Ian has many years of experience in the investment industry through 
investment research, investment management and in more recent years as an 
executive director of a number of leading South African Investment groups. He 
has served as a director of the South African Association of Unit Trusts and on 
the Fund Management Committee of the South African Retirement Fund 
Association. He is also a founder Member of the South African Chapter of 
Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA SA). Ian was appointed 
in June 2001 by the Minister of Finance, the Honourable Mr Trevor Manuel, to 
the Advisory Board of the FSB and has been reappointed in this position in 
October 2008. He has been involved in the discussions and drafting of the 
Regulations for the South African Hedge Fund industry.  
 
 Tony Christien - Director 
Qualifications: B. Com, CAIB (SA)MIAC 
Tony has had a long career in banking, including corporate banking, with FNB, 
formerly Barclays. He has also spent a number of years as an independent 
accountant, under the designation JAC Consulting Services. Tony oversees 
Treasury, Custody, New Business and Client Relations.  
 
 Peter Hartmann - Head: Fund Accounting 
Qualifications: B.Compt (Hons), CA (SA) 
Hedge Fund experience: 5 years  
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Peter has worked in the financial services industry since 1994 having first 
gained exposure at Firstcorp before moving to Syfrets, Nedcor Investment 
Bank, Franklin Templeton NIB and later Nedcor Wealth Management. He joined 
Bank of Bermuda’s (later HSBC) South African joint venture, Global Fund 
Services (SA), in 2003 and spent time in Dublin training on their Fund 
Administration system as part of the initial set-up of what is now the IDS Cape 
Town office.  Peter headed the IDS Fund Accounting function until the end of 
2007 when he moved into a specialist supporting role.  
 
 Craig McIver - Manager:  Group Risk and Compliance  
Qualifications:  BA, LLB. 
Hedge Fund experience: 5 years 
Since 1986, Craig has been working in the insurance and asset management 
industries. In addition to fund administration, he has been involved in 
remuneration structuring and pension fund accounting. He is a member of the 
Compliance Institute of South Africa. 
 
 Andy Pfaff - Founding partner: Trendline.  
Hedge Fund experience: 10 years 
Andy has worked in the South African financial markets since 1987. He has 
worked on the buy side, sell side & proprietary trading desks, in the money, 
bond, equity & derivatives markets. He has served as Deputy Chairman of the 
South African Institute of Financial Markets, and also on the board of the Hedge 
Fund Association of South Africa; both of these positions were resigned to 
concentrate exclusively on Trendline. He was a founding employee at a bank 
startup in 1987, founded an independent member of Safex in 1992, and 
founded Trendline Funds in 2007. 
 
3.4.2 INTERVIEWS 
 
Qualitative researchers gather data from multiple sources in any single study such 
as observations, interviews, objects, written documents, audiovisual materials, 
electronic documents, etc (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:143).   
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The first source from which primary data was collected was through the process of 
interviewing.  Following an unstructured approach to the interviews was deemed 
unsuitable.  The rational being that the researcher gets different information from 
different people and may not be able to make comparisons among the 
interviewees (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:146).     
 
The interview was semi structured in nature where the researcher followed a 
standard set of questions with one or more individually tailored questions.  This 
method was adopted to achieve clarity and to probe the reasoning of interviewees.  
The researcher allowed the questions to be answered in an open-ended format, 
where the researcher raised the topic and indicated the kind of answer but the 
actual answers were entirely up to the interviewee (Gillham, 2000:41).  The open-
ended method allows the respondent maximum flexibility over how to outline their 
answer.   
 
To optimise the interviewing process, the researcher used the following guidelines 
as suggested by Leedy and Ormrod (2005:147).  These are replicated below: 
 identify some questions in advance; 
 make sure the interviewees are representative of the group; 
 find a suitable location; 
 get written permission; 
 establish and maintain rapport; 
 focus on the actual rather than the hypothetical; 
 don’t put words in people’s mouths; 
 record responses verbatim; 
 keep your reactions to yourself; and 
 remember that you are not necessarily getting the facts. 
 
The interview questions were emailed in a Microsoft Word document to Ian 
Hamilton, the Chief Executive Officer of IDS, for redistribution to the management 
team.  The respondents were then allowed to take their own time in responding to 
the questions and emailing it back to the researcher.  Thus, flexibility was allowed 
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by conducting the interviews electronically through the use of emails.  The 
responses were recorded verbatim and accurately reflect the interviewee’s 
thoughts.   
 
3.4.3 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 
 
The second method of collecting the data was through documents analysis.  An 
article written during the 2008 financial crisis by two management employees of 
IDS was used as a discussion base.  The article, titled “A well oiled cog”, provided 
a thorough synopsis of the challenges facing IDS as an administrator and how they 
are addressing those challenges.   
 
The second document of which data was gathered was from an official roundtable 
discussion.  Experienced stakeholders in the South African hedge fund industry 
gave their viewpoints on the effects of the financial crisis on each of their 
businesses.   
 
3.4.4 PILOT STUDY 
 
The interview questions were sent to Harry McVea, a senior lecturer at the 
University of Bristol who specialises in financial services law and policy.  The 
individuals viewpoint on the interpretation and clarity of the interview questions 
posed was sought.  A local hedge fund manager, Siegfried Lokotsch was also 
contacted to gain insight into the challenges facing hedge funds in managing 
operational risk.   
 
The pilot work was done to ensure that the questions posed to respondents were 
feasible and that the responses obtained would be of sufficient quality to help 
answer the research question.   
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3.4.5 VALIDITY 
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2005:97) highlight two basic questions to determine the validity 
- “accuracy, meaningfulness and credibility” of the research project as a whole: 
 Does the study have sufficient controls to ensure that the conclusions drawn 
are truly warranted by the data? 
 Can the researcher use what was observed in the research situation to make 
generalisations about the world beyond that specific situation?  
 
To address the first question, the strategy called triangulation was employed to 
eliminate other possible explanations for the results observed.  Two data sources, 
namely in depth interviews and document analysis, were used to ensure a 
convergence of the data.   
 
In addressing the second question, the study focused on the executive 
management team of IDS as a representative sample to learn more about the firm 
and then draw conclusions about the firm as a whole.   
 
The conclusions drawn at the end of the study were taken back to the participants 
for verification and validation.  Questions such as the following were asked:  
 Do you agree with the conclusions?  
 Do they make sense based on your own experiences? 
 
3.4.6 RELIABILITY 
 
Reliability is the “consistency with which the measuring instrument yields a certain 
result when the entity being measured hasn’t changed” (Leedy and Ormrod 
2005:29).  These authors propose three ways to enhance the reliability of a 
measurement instrument: 
 The instrument should always be administered in a consistent fashion, thereby 
being standardised; 
 To the extent that subjective judgements are required, specific criteria should 
be established that dictate the kinds of judgements the researcher makes; and 
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 Research assistants who are using the instrument should be well trained so 
that they obtain similar results. 
 
Standardisation was adopted when using the measurement instrument.  The same 
interview questions were given to all respondents in the sample.  A pilot study 
helped determine: 
 the relevance of the questions posed to respondents; and 
 the format, syntax and structure used to compile them.   
 
The feedback received from Harry McVea and Siegfried Lokotsch indicated that 
the respondents would be able to understand all the questions and be able to 
articulate their responses. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to outline the research design, the different data 
gathering techniques and show the rational used by the researcher in making 
application decisions. This chapter provided the theoretical base upon which the 
empirical results can be applied in solving the main problem and its three sub-
dimensions. 
 
The following chapter deals with the analysis and interpretation of the empirical 
study findings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF 
THE RESULTS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter dealt with the methodology and research methods used in 
this study.  The data collected by means of interviews and document analysis are 
now analysed and interpreted.   
 
The information provided by the respondents is considered proprietary and 
remains confidential.  The empirical findings from the five respondents are 
presented in a disguised format as follows: respondent 1, respondent 2, 
respondent 3, respondent 4 and respondent 5.     
 
By categorising the data according to the research questions, the main themes 
during the analysis process became evident.  By using a composite data source 
more specific themes and patterns emerged than if a unitary source were used.    
Categorisation simplified the data reduction process and aided the researcher to 
see which ideas kept on reoccurring.   
 
In essence, this chapter explores the voice of operational practitioners with regard 
to the major them and sub dimensions of this research endeavour.  The viewpoints 
which emerged were further correlated with theory pertaining to the issues under 
scrutiny.   
 
4.2 CHANGES WITH REGARD TO THE VALUATION FUNCTION 
 
Sub problem one 
How has the 2008 financial crisis impacted the valuation function performed by 
administrators? 
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What follows is a verbatim transcript if the various questions posed, together with 
the responses articulated.   
 
Who do you think is in a better position to address the issue of timely and 
accurate valuations — hedge fund managers or IDS? Why? 
 
Respondent 1:  “IDS because fund managers should rather concentrate on 
managing money. From a best practise view a fund manager should not be 
involved in the valuation process at all as there is a temptation to adjust figures to 
enhance performance.” 
 
Respondent 2: “IDS as we are the fund accounting specialists who employ suitably 
qualified staff.  The workforce has the necessary skills to calculate the overall NAV 
of a fund including all necessary accruals and fee computations.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “IDS because the hedge fund manager’s main focus is 
performance.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “What is the issue? Everyone wants the same thing and that is the 
right price promptly and real-time, if possible. However, different parties want 
valuations for different reasons, e.g. the manager for risk or profit management and 
an administrator for performance calculation or investments and withdrawals. 
These timeframes required for final value do not necessarily coincide, so both 
might be the correct answer.” 
 
Respondent 5:  “IDS because our systems are geared to deal with this issue.  In 
addition we are also more independent in their assessment of their monthly NAV 
due to not being a part of the fund.” 
 
Documented commentary:  “IDS since we protect investor’s assets due to the 
independent calculation of NAV.  However, there is added responsibility to build 
the required organisational capability to deliver against these requirements.”   
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The common theme that resonates throughout these responses is that the 
administrator is the best party to perform the valuation function.  Their 
independence assists with reducing the likelihood of fraudulent practices on the 
hedge fund manager’s behalf.  The findings corroborate with the Deloitte Research 
(2007) study that found it becoming standard industry practice to have NAV 
assessments independently valued.  The hedge fund manager can then focus on 
managing the portfolio itself while IDS focuses on the valuations.    
 
However, respondent four highlights another important issue.  The hedge fund 
manager requires a quicker valuation for risk monitoring reasons and cannot rely 
on the administrator who provides final value at month end, for instance.  Thus, the 
need for more frequent and timely delivery of valuations by the administrator is 
critical. This is supported by the findings of Money Management Executive (MME, 
2005).   
 
What do you think is driving the shift to more timely, accurate net asset 
valuations in IDS? 
 
Respondent 1:  “Institutional investors such as the retirement industry.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “IDS itself is driving this shift as we have defined reporting 
timelines based on service level agreements in place with clients. Furthermore, 
IDS is liable to correct any NAV mis-statements. It is therefore in our best interests 
to ensure proper processes are in place to enable the delivery of accurate 
valuations.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “Investors are becoming more educated and demanding. The 
increase in institutional investors is also driving the shift.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “Investors are driving administrators to provide accurate pricing 
sooner. Managers have always done it for their internal management purposes.” 
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Respondent 5:  “There are a number of reasons, namely improved investor 
education and better risk analysis.” 
 
McVea (2008:133) found that the increase in institutional investors is driving the 
shift as they require more funds to have independent checks in place protecting 
their investment.   IDS expect the same pressures from institutional investors such 
as the retirement industry.  In addition, the company found the improvement in 
investor education about hedge funds has also played a role in delivering timelier 
and accurate valuations.   
 
Because IDS is liable for accuracy of valuations, the firm feels that it is “in their 
best interests” to ensure the delivery of accurate NAV.  For that reason, IDS finds 
themselves also driving the shift towards timely and accurate valuations.    
 
How are the valuation functions performed by IDS changing, i.e. what trends 
do you think there are? 
 
Respondent 1:  “Better sourcing for values of unlisted securities and better 
understanding of the valuation of unlisted securities. More emphasis is placed on 
mark to market.” 
 
Respondent 2: “No noticeable trends.” 
 
Respondent 3: “I am not an administrator, and therefore not able to comment 
convincingly on that.” 
  
Respondent 4:  “It is apparent that IDS will need to improve on their product 
offerings. NAV is processed more speedily but IDS still needs to be seen as adding 
more value.” 
 
Documented commentary: “Expanding of services that include a complex range of 
back office services, investor relations and secretarial services.  Delivery of more 
accurate services within contracted time frames to clients.” 
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The responses indicate that IDS are continuing to expand their product offering by 
means of increased middle and back office services.  The findings back up MME 
(2005) conclusions that increasing pressure for full range of back and middle office 
services such as trade processing, data management, risk management, 
custodianship, shareholder servicing and Web-based reporting are inherent.  As 
IDS expands their services, the company will have to deliver superior value for 
their customers.   
 
The changes in the valuation function experienced at IDS are improvements in the 
understanding of complex financial instruments, such as better sourcing of values 
and the practice of “mark to market”.  The accuracy of mathematical models may 
be in question when “marked to model” (McVea, 2008:137), hence IDS are placing 
more emphasis on “mark to market”. 
 
How do you see the recent financial crisis affecting IDS’ valuations in hedge 
funds? 
 
Respondent 1:  “Emphasis is being placed on third party valuations through 
administrators. A better understanding of the valuation of unlisted securities and 
also how to deal with seldom traded investments.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “There has been an increase in the number of funds exiting the 
industry as managers try and accommodate investors who have requested 
redemptions within their notice periods.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “A reduction in investments and more opportunities will unveil in 
volatile markets.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “Investors will insist on independent third party valuations and 
prefer exchange-traded products which provide public pricing.  CDS’, who were 
partly blamed for the financial crisis, will be put onto a well regulated central 
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clearinghouse or exchange to promote transparency and reduce risk to the 
financial system.” 
 
Respondent 5:  “Initially, the redemptions values have decreased.  But the hedge 
fund managers have limited the effects of the financial crisis and in 2009 the 
redemptions will level off.” 
 
The financial crisis has placed more emphasis on the independence of valuations 
in hedge funds.  A third party administrator provides the best opportunity for 
independence but will have to better understand the complexities of unlisted 
financial instruments.  Investors have preferred to invest in exchange traded 
products where there are readily available prices in the market.  IDS has also 
experienced an increase in the number of funds exiting the industry as a result of 
investors requesting redemptions within their notice periods.     
 
Respondent four draws attention to the valuation of Credit Default Swaps.  As the 
U.S. moves toward listing such complex assets on regulated exchange, the 
valuation of these instruments will be straightforward.  IDS will therefore use those 
readily available prices to value such instruments and will demonstrate improved 
transparency to investors.   
 
How might expanded regulations as a result of the crisis affect IDS, 
especially the valuation function? 
 
Respondent 1:  “More transparency will be required. South Africa is at the forefront 
with most regulations already in place or best practise already followed. The US is 
going to have the biggest change through the introduction of regulations which we 
already have.  While we follow AIMA guidelines they are for IDS a bench mark 
only. We strive to improve upon them and many processes we follow are unique 
and most probably will be adopted in time as best practise.” 
  
Respondent 2:  “The playing field will be levelled and increased guidance regarding 
hard to value investments.” 
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Respondent 3:  “It is Important to distinguish legislation versus regulation. The 
increased regulation will continue to insist on independent third party valuation and 
custodianship.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “The SA hedge fund industry has over the years implemented 
significant self-regulations which should go a long way to limit proposed future 
regulations.” 
 
Documented commentary:  “Independent outsourced administration remains a 
cornerstone of the self regulation that has become evident in the local industry.  It 
is therefore imperative that IDS remain at the cusp of, and in some cases ahead of, 
international global best practice.”   
 
Documented commentary: “The new 2A license is a world first.  We are the first 
country in the world that actually has distinguished between normal fund managers 
and hedge fund managers, that there is a higher criteria required for hedge fund 
managers. There are disclosure issues for hedge fund managers; we really have 
upped the game as to who can come into this space, the qualifications of the 
people in the industry and so on.  The local industry has actually said for many, 
years that we actually want to operate in a regulated environment. It makes things 
it a lot easier if you know the ground rules.” 
 
IDS offers its services to hedge funds under the guidance of AIMA and the FSB 
who have implemented regulations far more extensively than in the U.S.  The local 
hedge fund industry is characterised as self regulated where independent 
administration has become best practice.  However, guidance on how to value 
complex and/or illiquid financial instruments will continue to be evident.   
 
Increased regulation will affect IDS in that more transparency will be required. The 
responses confirm Ritter’s (2008) conclusions that greater transparency could 
restore shaken confidence in the industry by improving risk disclosure to investors.  
Tighter regulation and improvement in transparency will level the playing field as 
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undercapitalised or poorly managed funds will be forced out.  The “culling” of the 
industry results in fewer hedge funds and a smaller amount valuations performed 
by administrators.   
 
4.3 CHALLENGES FACED BY ADMINISTRATORS 
 
Sub problem two 
In their efforts to bring about improvement in hedge fund operational risk 
management practices, what challenges do administrators face? 
 
In addressing this issue, the following questions were posed.  Responses are 
provided verbatim. 
 
What do you believe are the current top valuation challenges for IDS? 
Respondent 1:  “Valuation of complex and seldom traded instruments.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “Unlisted instruments which include OTC, stale prices, non 
standard incentive fee calculations and sub-standard prime broking information.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “Consensus on value of suspended or rarely traded securities.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “Valuing OTC or non-exchange-traded assets.” 
 
Respondent 5:  “Keeping up with new instrument valuations, especially in the fixed 
income space.” 
 
Documented commentary:  “Increased complexity of financial instruments 
demands stronger compliance and comprehensive internal controls and 
procedures.” 
 
All the respondents indicated that the pricing of complex and/or illiquid financial 
instruments is the top valuation challenge for IDS.  Kundro and Feffer (2002:44) 
also found that OTC and rarely traded securities are prone to valuation problems.  
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System demands and having required technical expertise from investing in such 
securities are a challenge.   
 
In addition, IDS faces the challenge of stale prices, non standard incentive fee 
calculations and sub-standard prime broking information. Experiencing stale prices 
for actively traded securities were just some of the challenges included in Kundro 
and Feffer’s (2002:45) findings, however non standard incentive fee calculations 
were not included.   
 
According to the Financial Services Authority (2005): 
“In respect of assets for which there are no easy or robust valuation 
methodologies and counterparty quotes are unavailable, administrators 
usually accept the hedge fund manager’s own valuation. This can sometimes 
mean that a significant proportion of the fund’s assets are not subject to 
independent valuation. Hedge fund managers generally perform their own 
internal valuations of all positions and seek to reconcile these with the 
administrators at the end of the month. It would appear that the hedge fund 
managers may wield significant ability to influence the administrators’ 
independent valuations at this point in the process through their dialogue 
with administrator staff and the counterparties who are providing the 
quotes.” 
What is your opinion of the degree of independence being compromised? 
 
Respondent 1:  “This may be the case in the UK and the U.S.  IDS’s own 
standards are such that we would seek the assistance of an independent party in 
reaching a valuation that is satisfactory to the administrator.  IDS may be unique in 
that we contract with the fund, not the manager. Thereby our obligation lies with 
the investor, not the fund manager.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “Independence can be severely compromised if the administrator 
merely accepts a manager’s valuation without question or without sufficient 
information regarding the basis of such valuation. If deemed necessary, another 
 69 
third party valuation should be sought to ensure the reasonability of the manager’s 
value.”   
 
Respondent 3:  “Depends on materiality. If material there should be some form of 
independent valuation by the administrator. Also if more than one fund has the 
same/similar asset a similar value must be used, i.e. administrator wide 
consistency.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “All Trendline’s assets are exchange-traded and are thus easy to 
value, and that will remain the case in the future.  It is entirely inappropriate for 
administrators to rely on their client for valuations, if they are providing independent 
third party valuations. However, if it is disclosed in the offering documentation that 
a fund invests in difficult to value assets and that that the administrator relies on 
the manager for pricing, then it might be tolerable.” 
 
Respondent 5:  “This is not as apparent in South Africa.  Where a valuation is not 
available from an external third party, the valuation methodology is agreed 
between the parties and signed off by Price Waterhouse Coopers, our auditors.  
Should the percentage of unlisted securities be material then a comment relating to 
this is placed on the client’s monthly statements.” 
 
A major challenge in the valuation process occurs when the administrator’s 
independence gets compromised.  If hedge fund manager influences the 
administrator’s valuation, reliance on administrators to guarantee the quality of 
valuations of complex instruments amounts to wishful thinking (McVea, 2008:130).  
The respondents clarified that this is not apparent in the local hedge fund industry.  
If the hedge fund manager does provide input, independence is still retained as 
IDS seeks the assistance of another independent third party for hard to value 
instruments to ensure the reasonability of the manager’s value.  Additionally, a 
quality and well known auditing firm, PWC, performs audits on the funds IDS 
administer.   
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IDS provides transparency to investors by inserting a comment in the client’s 
monthly statements on the material involvement of the hedge fund manager in the 
valuation process.   Respondents believe that additional transparency in the 
offering documents as to disclosing what pricing methodologies are followed go a 
long way in managing the valuation risks involved.  Giraud (2005) confirms that 
such internal controls support the commitment that inefficiencies won’t be used 
against his or her own interest. 
 
What is your perception of the challenges associated with valuing complex 
assets such as mortgage backed securities and OTC derivatives? 
 
Respondent 1:  “Complexity only happens when there is no transparency. The sub 
prime crisis was created by smoke and mirrors with people readily accepting 
valuations that they did not understand.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “Fund administrators rarely have the skills within their 
organizations to price these and therefore have to place reliance on counterparties, 
prime brokers and independent pricing specialists to value such instruments.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “Non disclosure of methodology and assumptions.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “Administrators will probably be behind the curve on obtaining the 
technology to price these instruments, and may also not have access to 
information required to derive the prices or valuations.” 
 
Respondent 5:  “The problem with a lot of these instruments is that they are 
evolving continuously and this creates challenges from the valuation perspective.” 
 
Complex and/or illiquid assets are subjected to both liquidity and valuation 
problems.  A separate system books, values and processes these securities and 
then requires manual intervention to consolidate with the rest of the portfolio 
(Kundro and Feffer, 2002:44).  
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Operational risk results from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events (Thom, 2006).  The risks associated with pricing 
complex assets at IDS are as follows: 
 
 Failed internal process could result from improper disclosure of pricing 
methodology and assumptions.   
 People risk is initiated from the lack of skills to price the complex instruments 
and having to rely on counterparties, prime brokers and independent pricing 
specialists for information.    
 The risk of inadequate systems results from not having the technology to price 
the complex assets or to automatically reconcile prices with the prime brokers.   
 Risks from external events are derived from the sub standard prime broker 
information and the continuous evolvement of complex assets.  
 
4.4 ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES FACED BY ADMINISTRATORS 
 
Sub problem three 
How can the challenges faced by administrators be addressed? 
 
In addressing sub problem three, the following questions were posed.  Responses 
are provided verbatim. 
 
What pricing sources does IDS use to value complex/illiquid assets? 
Respondent 1:  “The Market Data Team would gather data from multiple sources 
such as broker quotes and independent pricing specialists.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “Independent pricing specialists.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “Trendline does not trade them.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “There are a number of areas, SAFEX, BONDEX and 
BLOOMBERG for listed instruments. Where there are no official independent 
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prices available then our pricing committee would first agree on pricing 
methodology.” 
 
IDS relies on broker quotes and independent pricing specialists for the pricing of 
complex/illiquid assets.  A combination of sources is sound practice because the 
Deloitte Research (2007) survey found that using broker quotes alone raises 
serious issues.  These were previously discussed under the challenges in 
operational risk management, section 2.4.   
 
How does IDS provide investors with sufficient confidence that valuing 
illiquid assets are done in a fair, dependable and consistent manner? 
 
Respondent 1:  “We place a warning on statements as to what percentage falls into 
these classes. This should be a standard industry practise.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “Independent pricing specialists are used to price such instruments 
if these form a material portion of the fund’s NAV. To ensure consistency, the 
pricing models don’t vary from one valuation to the next without valid reason.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “Disclosure on methodologies and assumptions, consistency of the 
valuation process.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “Demonstrate pricing methods and information sources to clients 
i.e. transparency and consistency of policy and process. The use of mathematical 
models would require disclosure upfront, and agree upfront to methodology and 
inputs.  The agreement needs to be between the administrator and hedge fund 
manager and should be in writing and placed in policy.” 
 
Respondent 5:  “While each asset would need to be reviewed independently, the 
general trend is to follow a recognised and agreed protocol and then ensure that 
the resultant process is performed consistently and reviewed regularly.” 
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The literature study exposed several practices that an administrator needs to 
perform to address the challenges involved in managing operational risk.  IDS 
performs the following practices to ensure that investors are provided with 
sufficient confidence that valuing illiquid assets are done in a fair, dependable and 
consistent manner. 
 
 Transparency: valuation methodologies and assumptions are disclosed to the 
investor and warnings are placed on statements highlighting the percentage 
market value of illiquid and/or complex assets.    
 
 Independence: each instrument is reviewed independently through the use of 
third party pricing specialists.  Kundro and Feffer (2002:46) emphasise that 
sources need to be independent of the investment manager, especially for 
complex instruments.   
 
 Consistency:  IDS’ agreed set of rules is consistently followed and reviewed 
regularly.  Additionally, the pricing models do not vary from one valuation to the 
next without valid reason.  The firm follows the recommendations made by the 
Bank of New York and Amber Partners (2006), of which is that price 
consistency requires similar securities to be valued the same way both at a 
point in time and over time.   
 
To what extent do you think that managed accounts and side pockets assist 
IDS in addressing the challenges associated with valuing complex assets? 
 
Respondent 1:  “They obfuscate issues. Managed accounts are also going to come 
under scrutiny given what has transpired in the US, unless they are independently 
valued.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “Depends on materiality and proper disclosure. I would be 
concerned if the entire fund was valued on this basis.”   
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Respondent 3:  “Managed accounts and side-pockets have their respective 
benefits, and assist in providing portfolio transparency, but do not assist specifically 
in valuing the specific assets.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “They are probably the only fair method to ensure that no investor 
is unduly prejudiced.  However, it does make the valuation process more difficult 
as mini fund valuations are required for each side pocket.” 
 
Managed accounts and side pockets assist IDS in providing transparency of the 
portfolio and help ensure that investor’s assets are protected from fraudulent 
practice.  However, the valuations of such mechanisms are far more difficult and 
complicate issues.  The findings support Giraud’s (2005) opinion that the 
mechanisms require extensive understanding of the instruments traded and might 
result in an operational “headache”.  
 
The HFWG (2007) consider side pockets as an attractive solution.  However, IDS 
believe they do have their respective benefits, but do not specifically assist in 
valuing the particular instruments.     
 
How are the following operational challenges in IDS being addressed? 
 A hedge fund manager overrides prices of an administrator 
 
Respondent 1:  “A disclaimer would be published on all investor statements 
reflecting the lack of independence on the pricing of such instruments and their 
percentage market value of the total NAV.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “There is a valuations committee that must approve any non 
standard price. Investor statements are sent directly to the investors in PDF.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “Insist on independent third party instrument pricing and portfolio 
valuation. Pricing methodologies and policies must be agreed on prior to taking on 
clients.” 
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Respondent 4:  “Should we not be able to back the valuations for any reason with 
sufficient supporting information, we should either not continue with the valuation, 
or heavily endorse the client statements to this effect.” 
 
AIMA (2005) found that 36 percent of hedge funds override prices provided by the 
administrator.  The responses obtained from the above-mentioned question 
indicate that IDS would publish a disclaimer on investor statements highlighting the 
percentage market value of manager input into the valuation process.  Final NAV is 
also addressed directly to investors, which concurs with the best practice guide of 
the MFA (2007).   
 
A hedge fund manager may in some cases have the best insight for valuing 
particular instruments (MFA, 2007).  IDS realises this by means of not approving 
their client’s statements if sufficient supporting information is not provided by the 
hedge fund manager.   
 
IDS therefore displays transparency in the valuation process and exhibits evidence 
of robustness in their internal controls and procedures.   
 
 Fraudulent attempts by the hedge fund manager to inflate/deflate the 
value of fund 
 
Respondent 1:  “Inform the investors.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “Ensure adequate information is available to prove such allegation 
before advising the FSB.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “We will not accept this. On checking, if we are convinced that the 
intent is fraudulent we will ask the client to find another administrator plus advise 
his compliance officer.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “Fire the client and advise investors of termination of service to 
fund.” 
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Since IDS addresses the final statements directly to investors, a hedge fund 
manager cannot attempt to inflate/deflate the value of the fund. In the literature 
study, the researcher found two owners of the Bayou hedge fund fabricated the 
independent audit reports by creating a fictitious accounting firm known as 
Richmond-Fairfield Associates (Donahue, 2007:240).  IDS is a credible and 
independent administrator who is responsible for the supervision of the month end 
valuation process.  Manager attempts to alter the value of a fund are therefore 
removed.   
 
 Adjustments or discounts on the value of the asset to reflect the market 
impact when liquidated 
 
Respondent 1:  “We practice mark to market.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “If adequate information is available to prove such impact, then the 
values should in certain circumstances be adjusted accordingly to reflect the true 
liquidation price.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “The internal pricing committee approves any non standard price.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “Agree on policies and procedures at initiation of relationship.” 
 
Respondent 5:  “Refer to the internal pricing committee.” 
 
Positions that make up a large proportion of a single issued security require an 
adjustment or discount to reflect the market impact when liquidated (Kundro and 
Feffer, 2002:43).  This problem is exacerbated when prices are marked to model.  
The findings demonstrate that IDS’ internal pricing committee practices mark to 
market to maintain accuracy of valuations.  The firm utilises a variety of 
independent sources to value such instruments (as described in section 4.4) which 
assist in obtaining the most accurate market value.   
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 Software failure, hacking or manipulation of data 
 
Respondent 1:  “Extensive investment on IT software. Manipulation of data would 
require the cooperation of a number of people but we have checks and balances 
that would deter this behaviour.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “We have extensive precautions in place to prevent these as well 
as business continuity/disaster recovery.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “The obvious techniques such as backups, passwords etc.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “This would need to be dealt with on an ad hoc basis.” 
 
Thom (2006) found that the valuation process faces the challenge of on line 
problems that relate to hacking and manipulation of private data.  IDS addresses 
this challenge through extensive investment in technology.  In addition, internal 
controls and proper governance help to deter the manipulation of data.   
 
How do you think IDS is addressing the challenge of “stale” prices, resulting 
from bad market feeds, human error or other issues, even for actively traded 
instruments? 
 
Respondent 1:  “We monitor stale prices and discuss the valuations of these with 
third party. We correct errors from mistakes that could occur through the issues 
mentioned above.”   
 
Respondent 2:  “Obtain periodic valuation from reputable independent pricing 
specialists.  In addition, obtain confirmation of prices from another pricing feed (i.e. 
use of Reuters/INET in conjunction with Bloomberg).” 
 
Respondent 3:  “There is a Valuations Committee that must approve any non 
standard price. We insist on using only one price for instruments held by different 
funds.” 
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Respondent 4:  “IDS should reconcile portfolio valuations to prime brokers and 
fund manager. All three prices should confirm each other.”  
 
Respondent 5:  “This would depend on materiality.” 
 
Even actively traded securities are susceptible to “stale” prices in the case of IDS.  
The firm overcomes the challenge by obtaining prices from multiple sources such 
as independent pricing specialists and pricing feeds known as Reuters and 
Bloomberg.  IDS requires confirmation of prices from all the sources and monitors 
any stale price consistently.  One price is then used for the same instrument held 
by different funds that IDS administers.   
 
The Bank of New York and Amber Partners (2006) suggest that failure to appoint 
well-known, proven and independent service providers may be a warning sign to 
investors.  Respondent two alluded to the reputation of pricing specialists, as a 
quality service provider assists with the accuracy of valuations. Additionally, IDS’ 
system capabilities mentioned below allow for the reduction in human error through 
automated reconciliation from prime brokers, feeds and pricing specialists.  The 
advanced systems help to address the “stale” price challenge.   
 
Technology plays a vital role in hedge fund administration.  What are some 
of the "must-have" systems capabilities IDS employs to address the 
valuation issues?  
 
Respondent 1:  “A proper accounting system that allows for best practise and has 
as few manual interventions as possible.”   
 
Respondent 2:  “World class standard software for all valuation critical systems, i.e. 
independently written and supported by reputable suppliers.”  
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Respondent 3:  “The main valuation system, PAXUS in our case, plus the 
automated reconciliation of feeds from independent pricing sources, prime brokers, 
etc.” 
 
It is evident that IDS invests in systems and technology that utilise straight through 
processing to the accounting systems.  The firm’s automated reconciliation of 
feeds from various sources reduces the need for manual intervention and helps 
manage operational risks (Bank of New York and Amber Partners, 2006).  Their 
accounting system and software are also internationally recognised which can 
perform the required technological tasks as described by MME (2005).  Paxus 
integrates into one system all the processes that were previously performed on 
multiple systems. The benefits of this approach are increased efficiency, reduced 
risk of error and quicker valuations.   
 
What do you think are some of the other core strengths that IDS has? 
 
Respondent 1:  “IDS has expert staff. IDS’ administration is 50 percent systems 50 
percent staff. Normal administration is 90 percent system and 10 percent staff.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “A robust IT infrastructure, good fund accounting system supported 
by a reliable vendor, highly skilled staff and sound processes.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “Independence. IDS drives industry changes – i.e. help set industry 
norms and standards.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “IDS does the job and I’m happy with that. One business can’t do 
everything, because then there would not be independent third party verification.” 
 
Respondent 5:  “Technology is good, but the core team of people and expertise are 
equally as important.”  . 
 
Documented commentary:  “Investment in technical skills training, the development 
of employee’s capacity for personal growth and provide them with confidence to 
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manage complex situations.  Employee commitment is derived from the 
development of employees, the recognition of employee accomplishments and the 
fostering of individual and team initiative. “ 
 
The strengths articulated by IDS are independence, robust systems and 
technological infrastructure and highly skilled staff.  It is clear from the above that 
the firm takes pride in employing specialist staff that have the required level of 
knowledge and expertise.  Understanding underlying investment strategies, pricing 
options and derivatives and running pricing models for complex instruments are 
some of the requirements of the administration workforce (MME, 2005).  IDS 
furthermore displays commitment in developing the skills of it staff through its 
training programmes and culture of teamwork.  
 
Some funds prefer to in-source administration to save millions of rands, and 
because very few administrators can provide daily NAV.  How do you think 
IDS is addressing this trend? 
 
Respondent 1:  “We do daily valuations. In-house is a licence to fraud on the 
investor and is likely to be regulated against. Frankly, most companies do not have 
the systems or the core competency to do in-house valuations and save money.” 
 
Respondent 2:  “IDS has the capability to provide daily pricing.” 
 
Respondent 3:  “IDS does daily NAV’s for appropriate funds. Requests for daily’s 
can indicate an unhealthy trend towards retailing of hedge funds.” 
 
Respondent 4:  “Get faster and reduce prices.  Economies of scale at IDS should 
make them competitive with in-house administration, apart from the corporate 
governance benefits.”  
 
Respondent 5:  “IDS is moving towards daily NAV’s and process more than just the 
general administration functions.” 
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Documented commentary:  “Provide error free products and services and delivery 
of these services within contracted time frames.”   
 
The RBC Special Report (2005) discovered that very few administrators can 
produce daily NAV.  Consequently, funds are doing the valuations themselves to 
and are saving millions of dollars by keeping the costs “in-house”.  The findings 
reflect that IDS does provide daily pricing for its clients and because of economies 
of scale, their services are competitive.  As a result of the financial crisis, more 
emphasis will be placed on independent valuations.  In sourcing the administrative 
activities will therefore be regulated against.    
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter focused on the analysis and interpretation of the results obtained from 
the empirical study. Comparisons of the data obtained were related to the 
contemporary literature with regard to an administrator’s role of managing 
operational risk in hedge funds. The analysis and interpretation of the results was 
approached with the specific aim to resolve the research questions described in 
chapter one.  
 
Chapter five will focus on the conclusion and recommendations based on the 
findings of this chapter.   Opportunities for further research will also be discussed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In chapter four, the results of the empirical study were presented and analysed.  
The results obtained were compared with the contemporary literature reviewed in 
chapter two of this study. 
 
In this chapter, the study is summarised and the main findings are related back to 
the core issues addressed initially.  Recommendations will be made based on the 
main findings of the research and will be followed by opportunities for further 
research. The chapter concludes with a chapter summary. 
 
5.2 SUMMARY OF STUDY 
 
The summary of the study will include an outline and resolution of the main and 
sub-problems of the research.   A summary of the main findings will then be 
identified from the previous chapter. 
 
5.2.1 MAIN AND SUB PROBLEMS 
 
The main problem of the study was identified in chapter one as: 
 
How can administrators improve operational risk management practices in 
hedge funds? 
 
Three sub-problems were identified as an appropriate solution to the main problem 
of the study. These were: 
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 Sub problem one 
How has the 2008 financial crisis impacted the valuation function performed by 
administrators? 
 
 Sub problem two 
In their efforts to bring about improvement in hedge fund operational risk 
management practices, what challenges do administrators face? 
 
 Sub problem three 
How can the challenges faced by administrators be addressed? 
 
The sub-problems were resolved through the analysis and interpretation of the 
results obtained from the empirical study as outlined in chapter four. 
 
5.2.2 SYNOPSIS OF EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
A summary of the main findings of the study will be described under the following 
sub-headings: 
 changes with regard to the valuation function; 
 challenges faced by administrators; and 
 addressing the challenges faced by administrators. 
 
 Changes with regard to the valuation function 
 
The function of calculating the NAV continues to be the responsibility of the 
administrator.  The administrator provides the required level of independence 
requested by the institutional investor base.  Such practice makes good sense in 
achieving the most accurate NAV possible.  However, Investment Data Services 
(IDS) is facing pressure to improve on the timely delivery of NAV for the risk 
monitoring purposes of the hedge fund manager.   
 
Not only is the shift for faster NAV being driven by the institutional investor, it is 
also driven by the administrator themselves.  IDS are liable for the accuracy of its 
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valuations and are therefore introducing processes for the efficient calculation of 
NAV.   
 
Emerging trends concerning the valuation function are the expansion of product 
offerings which included middle and back office services.  Another trend is the 
improvement in understanding unlisted instruments through better sourcing of 
values and practicing “mark to market”.   
 
The financial crisis has placed more emphasis on the independence and 
transparency of the valuation process.  The complexities involved in thinly traded 
instruments are forcing investors to rather spend their money on exchange listed 
products where public information is available.  In the US, Credit Default Swaps will 
be placed on a listed exchange and would help IDS’ valuation in those securities 
and provide improved transparency to investors.   
 
Regulation as a result of the crisis is certain in many jurisdictions around the world.  
However, the South African industry has been far more proactive in regulating 
hedge fund managers by means of the 2A license.  Independent valuation is the 
industry norm and disclosure issues have since been abated.  Self regulations will 
therefore limit proposed future regulations.   
 
 Challenges faced by administrators 
 
The most important challenge faced by IDS in the valuation process is the pricing 
of complex and/or illiquid instruments. Such instruments are over the counter 
derivatives and credit default swaps. Complex instruments are continuously 
evolving and getting consensus on the value of such instruments is also a 
challenge.   
 
Other challenges faced by IDS are stale prices, non standard incentive fee 
calculations and sub standard prime broker information.   
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The literature study drew attention to the degree of independence being 
compromised when the hedge fund manager has input into the valuation process.  
This does not happen in the case of IDS.   Any participation in the NAV calculation 
by the manager would require another independent pricing specialist to confirm the 
values.  In addition, a disclaimer is placed on investor statements as to the lack of 
independence into the valuation process.   
 
 Addressing the challenges faced by administrators 
 
To address the challenge of valuing complex and/or illiquid instruments, IDS 
gathers prices from multiple sources, such as broker quotes and independent 
pricing specialists.  Their valuation methodologies and assumptions are disclosed 
to the investor and warnings are placed on statements highlighting the percentage 
market value of illiquid and/or complex assets.   IDS’ agreed set of rules is 
consistently followed and reviewed regularly.  The pricing models do not vary from 
one valuation to the next without valid reason.  IDS therefore displays 
independence, consistency and transparency in the valuation process. 
 
The findings suggested that managed accounts and side pockets confuse the 
valuation of unlisted instruments.  They have their respective benefits such as 
improved transparency but do not assist in specifically valuing these assets.   
 
IDS addresses the challenge of stale prices by obtaining values from a 
combination of sources and feeds.  Prices are then confirmed by the pricing 
committee and one price is used for the same security across all funds IDS 
administers.  The company’s systems allow for automated reconciliation of prices 
from the various sources which limit the amount of manual intervention in the 
valuation process.  PAXUS, which is their primary system, is internationally 
recognised and boasts increased efficiency, reduced risk of error and quicker 
valuations. 
 
One of the core strengths of IDS is its staff.  The firm employs specialists with the 
required level of knowledge and expertise to understand complex instruments.  IDS 
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also displays commitment in developing the skills of it staff through its training 
programmes and culture of teamwork.   
 
The quality of IDS’ service providers help the company achieve efficient and 
accurate valuations of its instruments.  Reputable pricing specialists are consulted 
and one of the “big four” audit firms, Price Waterhouse Coopers, is commissioned 
to perform annual audits.   
 
The trend of hedge funds to keep administration activities in-house is addressed by 
IDS through delivery of daily pricing for more of its clients.  Because of economies 
of scale, the firm’s services are competitive.  The financial crisis has placed more 
emphasis on independent valuations and performing valuations in-house will 
therefore be regulated against.  
 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The findings indicate IDS’ business model can be used as a template of how a 
hedge fund administrator should perform the valuation function.  The company 
displays independence, consistency, proper governance, robust internal controls 
and transparency in the valuation process.  The quality of the firm’s technical 
expertise and IT systems as well as its service providers help to address the 
challenges in operational risk management.   
 
It can be concluded that IDS provides a good representation of how an 
administrator should address the challenges faced in managing hedge fund 
operational risk.  The role of an administrator will be enhanced as future 
regulations are imminent.  IDS has placed itself in a prominent position to grow its 
market share in a dynamic and opaque hedge fund industry. 
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5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In conducting a literature scrutiny, obvious disparities arose between IDS practice 
and published information.  This void acted as a springboard for in-depth academic 
review.  The following represents the recommendations to this study: 
 
 As the hedge fund industry succumbs to the pressures of increased regulations, 
IDS will find itself in a position to take advantage of the increased valuation 
responsibilities.  The firm’s established market share of 70 percent put IDS in 
good stead for future business as a result of regulations, hence adapting to the 
changing trends in hedge funds.  However, continuing to ensure that IDS adds 
value to its services needs to remain a priority.  Ways of doing this are by: 
 calculating NAV faster; 
 minimising the costs of its services; and  
 reducing the amount of manual processes.   
 
 Although IDS places more emphasis on “mark to market” for the valuation of it 
instruments, the company will encounter instances where “mark to model” is 
appropriate.  With the use of mathematical models, IDS should ensure that the 
model inputs are agreed upon with the hedge fund manager from the outset.  
Pricing can run smoothly thereafter.  In addition, disclosing the methodology 
upfront will assist with IDS’ extent of transparency to investors as investors are 
then aware of appropriate positions.   
 
 The challenge of stale prices and sub standard prime broker information can be 
addressed at IDS as follows: 
 reconcile portfolio valuations to prime brokers and fund manager, 
with all three prices confirming each other; 
 ensure the broker is counterparty to the transaction; 
 ensure the broker would be ready to close the position at the quoted 
value; 
 ensure that broker rotation is followed to get a variety of views; 
 solicit multiple broker quotes from the prime broker; and 
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 prices should be back tested to check for reasonableness and 
systematic bias. 
 
5.5 OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
It is envisaged that this study can lay the foundation for further research.  Areas for 
further research in respect of the valuation function may be regarding: 
 
 What extent do South African hedge funds invest in complex and/or illiquid 
financial instruments? 
 
 How effective are side pockets and managed accounts in assisting 
administrators manage valuation risks? 
 
 What the effect of the financial crisis is on “mark to model” practices since their 
accuracy has been in question? 
 
 How effective will a standardised approach be to the valuation methodologies of 
complex and/or illiquid instruments?  
 
5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter focused on concluding the study by reviewing the main problem and 
resolving each of the identified sub-problems.  The main findings of the empirical 
study were summarised.  The research has shown that IDS strives to be a 
benchmark for the hedge fund administration industry.  
 
Three areas of the valuation process were then reiterated and assisted the 
researcher in developing recommendations provided.  The recommendations could 
be used by IDS to further enhance its management of operational risk in hedge 
funds. The study concluded with opportunities for further research. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
THE COVERING LETTER 
 
01 December 2008 
Attention: Ian Hamilton, CEO 
IDS, Cape Town 
 
Dear Sir, 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON HEDGE FUND ADMINISTRATOR’S ROLE 
 
This survey represents the partial fulfilment of the requirement to complete my 
studies towards a Master’s degree in Business Administration. 
  
The purpose of the study is to improve operational risk management practices, 
particularly valuations, in hedge funds through identifying ways of promoting 
effective functioning of independent third-party administrators. 
 
As your views and comments are important in achieving to the objectives of this 
study, care has been taken to make the process of answering the questions with 
minimum inconvenience and should not take longer than 30 minutes of your time. 
All your responses will be treated as confidential. 
 
I thank you for the time and effort taken in filling out this questionnaire. 
 
Regards 
 
Juane Schutte 
NMMU MBA Student 
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APPENDIX B 
 
THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
SECTION A 
Who do you think is in a better position to address the issue of timely and accurate 
valuations — hedge fund managers or IDS? Why 
 
What do you think is driving the shift to more timely, accurate net asset valuations 
in IDS? 
 
How are the valuation functions performed by IDS changing, i.e. what trends do 
you think there are? 
 
How do you see the recent financial crisis affecting IDS’ valuations in hedge funds? 
  
How might expanded regulations as a result of the crisis affect IDS, especially the 
valuation function? 
 
SECTION B 
What do you believe are the current top valuation challenges for IDS? 
 
According to the Financial Services Authority (2005): 
“In respect of assets for which there are no easy or robust valuation methodologies 
and counterparty quotes are unavailable, administrators usually accept the hedge 
fund manager’s own valuation. This can sometimes mean that a significant 
proportion of the fund’s assets are not subject to independent valuation. Hedge 
fund managers generally perform their own internal valuations of all positions and 
seek to reconcile these with the administrators at the end of the month. It would 
appear that the hedge fund managers may wield significant ability to influence the 
administrators’ independent valuations at this point in the process through their 
dialogue with administrator staff and the counterparties who are providing the 
quotes.” 
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What is your opinion of the degree of independence being compromised? 
 
What is your perception of the challenges associated with valuing complex assets 
such as mortgage backed securities and OTC derivatives? 
 
SECTION C 
What pricing sources does IDS use to value complex/illiquid assets? 
 
How does IDS provide investors with sufficient confidence that valuing illiquid 
assets are done in a fair, dependable and consistent manner? 
 
To what extent do you think that managed accounts and side pockets assist IDS in 
addressing the challenges associated with valuing complex assets? 
 
How are the following operational challenges in IDS being addressed? 
 A hedge fund manager overrides prices of an administrator 
 
 Fraudulent attempts by the hedge fund manager to inflate/deflate the value of 
fund 
 
 Adjustments or discounts on the value of the asset to reflect the market impact 
when liquidated 
 
 Software failure, hacking or manipulation of data 
 
 
How do you think IDS is addressing the challenge of “stale” prices, resulting from 
bad market feeds, human error or other issues, even for actively traded 
instruments? 
 
Technology plays a vital role in hedge fund administration.  What are some of the 
"must-have" systems capabilities IDS employs to address the valuation issues?  
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What do you think are some of the other core strengths that IDS has? 
 
Some funds prefer to in-source administration to save millions of rands, and 
because very few administrators can provide daily NAV.  How do you think IDS is 
addressing this trend? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
